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COMMENT
Remedies-Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an
Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule
Becomes Outdated
One of the more entrenched tenets of the law of remedies has been that
lost profits for breach of contract cannot be recovered on behalf of an
unestablished business for the reason that without a history of past profits
the existence of any profits that would have been realized but for the breach
cannot be proven with the requisite legal "certainty" necessary to allow a
recovery.I This principle, sometimes known as the "new business rule," 2 is
the most frequently invoked corollary of the more general doctrine that
damages must be proven with certainty. 3 Problems in this area have arisen in
diverse cases involving distributorships and selling agencies, 4 franchises, 5
I. For formulations of the rule, see, e.g., United States v. Dura-Lux Int'l Corp., 529
F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1976); McBrayer v. Teckla, Inc., 496 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1974);
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1901); Koehler v. Cummings, 380
F. Supp. 1294, 1312 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Gibson v. Hercules Mfg. & Sales Co., 80 Cal. App. 689,
702, 252 P. 780, 785 (1927); Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 200, 279 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1955);
Consumers' Pure Ice Co. v. Jenkins, 58 11. App. 519,525 (1895); Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58,
70, 120 P.2d 611, 618 (1941); Knier v. Azores Constr. Co., 78 Nev. 20, 24, 368 P.2d 673, 675
(1962); Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 427, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (1938); D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3, at 154-55 (1973); 1 T. SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 183 (9th ed. A. Sedgwick & J. Beale 1920); 1 J.
SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 67 (4th ed. 1916); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages § 173 (1965); Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64
HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 (1950); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 156 (1919). See generally Note, Speculative
Profits as Damages for Breach of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 696 (1933); Note, Damages-
Loss of Profits Caused by Breach of Contract-Proof of Certainty, 17 MINN. L. REV. 194
(1933).
2. Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 16,390 P.2d 677,687 (1964). This name
is somewhat misleading in that the rule applies to any business without a history of profits in the
period immediately preceding the breach. See text accompanying notes 60-70 infra.
3. It is often said in new business cases that "profits are uncertain." This is properly
understood as a characterization of the evidence rather than of profits themselves, because
profits are-tautologically speaking-profits. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1022, at 139
(1964). In addition, profits are frequently described not only as "uncertain," but also as
"speculative, conjectural, and remote." This heaping on of pejorative adjectives adds nothing
to the analysis-perhaps the surplusage is used to emphasize the presumptuousness of anyone
who would dare come into court with such a claim.
4. Compare, e.g., McBrayer v. Teckla, Inc., 496 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974), and Goodman
v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948), and Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), and Brigham & Co. v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 243 (1884), and Carolene Sales Co. v.
Canyon Milk Prods. Co., 122 Wash. 220, 210 P. 366 (1922) (lost profit recovery not allowed),
with, e.g., Lee v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc., 522 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977), and Autowest, Inc.
v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970), and Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chem. Co., 218 F.2d 104
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contracts to loan money for the launching of a business, 6 leases,7 motion
picture distribution,8 entertainment and sporting events, 9 crops, 10 fishing
expeditions, 11 well drilling and mining, 2 book publishing,' 3 construction
(3d Cir. 1955), and Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1973),
and Oliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. 304, 52 N.W. 609 (1892), and Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson
Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886), and Furrer v. Int'l Health Assurance Co., 256 Or.
429, 474 P.2d 759 (1970) (lost profit recovery allowed). See generally Recent Cases, 14 MINN. L.
REV. 820 (1930).
5. Compare, e.g., Mullen v. Brantley, 213 Va. 765, 195 S.E.2d 696 (1973) (lost profit
recovery not allowed), with, e.g., Burks v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 183 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1950), and
Gordon v. Indusco Mgmt. Corp., 164 Conn. 262, 320 A.2d 811 (1973), and Nash v. Thousand
Islands Steamboat Co., 123 App. Div. 148, 108 N.Y.S. 336 (1908), and Smith Dev. Corp. v.
Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973) (lost profit recovery allowed).
6. See, e.g., Stanish v. Polish Roman Catholic Union of Am., 484 F.2d 713 (7th Cir.
1973); Towles v. Cincinatti Tobacco Warehouse Co., 146 Ky. 301, 142 S.W. 401 (1912); St. Paul
at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
857 (1971); Shurtleff v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Neb. 557, 181 N.W. 374 (1921);
Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 120 P.2d 611 (1941); Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535
S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (lost profit recovery not allowed).
7. Compare, e.g., Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amusement Co., 260
Mass. 265, 157 N.E. 532 (1927), and Jurcec v. Raznik, 104 Mont. 45, 64 P.2d 1076 (1937), and
Weiss v. Revenue Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.J.L. 208, 182 A. 891 (1936), and Sporleder v.
Gonis, 68 Wis. 2d 554,229 N.W.2d 602 (1975) (lost profit recovery not allowed), with, e.g., Fera
v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976), and Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn.
App. 129, 469 S.W.2d 678 (1971) (lost profit recovery allowed). See generally Annot., 104
A.L.R. 132 (1936).
8. Compare, e.g., Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E.
756 (1919) (lost profit recovery not allowed), with, e.g., William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 811 (1948), and Madison Pictures, Inc. v. Pictorial Films, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 302, 151
N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1956), and Lester v. Fox Film Corp., 114 S.C. 533, 104 S.E. 178 (1920)
(lost profit recovery allowed), and, e.g., Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc.,
316 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified sub nom. Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy
Pictures Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (lost profit recovery allowed for plaintiff's
established theaters, but denied for newly-opened one).
9. See, e.g., Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 II1. App. 542 (1932); Todd v.
Keene, 167 Mass. 157, 45 N.E. 81 (1896); Camera v. Schmeling, 236 App. Div. 460,260 N.Y.S.
82 (1932); Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y. 354, 29 N.E. 255 (1891) (lost profit recovery not
allowed). Compare Rombola v. Cosindas, 351 Mass. 382, 220 N.E. 2d 919 (1966), with Alderson
v. Miami Beach Kennel Club, Inc., 336 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976); compare Brady v.
Erlanger, 188 App. Div. 728, 177 N.Y.S. 301 (1919), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 563, 132 N.E. 889 (1921),
with Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756 (1919).
10. Compare, e.g., Crowley, Inc. v. Soelberg, 8 Idaho 480, 346 P.2d 1063 (1959), and
Rhodes v. Sigler, 44 Ill. App. 3d 375, 357 N.E.2d 846 (1976), and Gray v. Gray, 30 N.C. App.
205, 226 S.E.2d 417 (1976), and Harrison-Daniels Co. v. Aughtrey, 309 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) (lost profit recovery not allowed), with, e.g., Malone v. Hastings, 193 F. 1 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 229 U.S. 618 (1912), and Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
66 Wash. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966) (lost profit recovery
allowed). See generally 34 HARV. L. REV. 662 (1921).
11. Compare, e.g., Putnam v. Lower, 236 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1956) (lost profit recovery not
allowed), with, e.g., Whitelaw v. United States, 9 F.2d 103 (N.D. Cal. 1925), and Blanchard v.
Makinster, 137 Or. 58, 1 P.2d 583 (1931) (lost profit recovery allowed).
12. Compare, e.g., Fisher v. Hampton, 44 Cal. App. 3d 741,118 Cal. Rptr. 811(1975) (lost
profit recovery not allowed), with, e.g., Sanford v. East Riverside Irrigation Dist., 101 Cal. 275,
35 P. 865 (1894), and Robinson v. Rispin, 33 Cal. App. 536, 165 P. 979 (1917), and Johnson v.
Wright, 175 Minn. 236, 220 N.W. 946 (1928), and Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lee Farm Oil Co.,
230 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (lost profit recovery allowed).
13. Compare, e.g., Manney v. Burgess, 346 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (lost profit
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delays, 14 promotional ventures 15 and ventures to develop or market a new
product. 16 Whether it is deemed a flexible guide to characterization of
evidence, or a per se rule of exclusion, the new business rule has served to
frustrate the overall remedial policy of seeking to put the nonbreaching party
in as good a position as he would have been had the contract been fully
performed.17 This frustation is a result of an arbitrary disregard of possibly
relevant evidence other than a history of past profits, which thwarts many
meritorious claims. In recent years, however, a number of decisions have
allowed lost profit awards for unestablished businesses,18 and there is an
increasing trend either to create exceptions and mitigating sub-doctrines to
the new business rule or simply to recognize that its rationale is no longer
persuasive. A number of factors have contributed to this development;
among them, the influence of the liberal recovery policy of private plaintiff
antitrust cases, 19 increasing acceptance of the "yardstick" measure of
recovery not allowed), with, e.g., For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1280
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (lost profit recovery allowed).
14. Compare, e.g., Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891), and
Consumers' Pure Ice Co. v. Jenkins, 58 Ill. App. 519 (1895), and Evergreen Amusement Corp.
.v. Milstead, 112 A.2d 901 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1955), and Peabody Constr. Co. v. First Fed.
Parking Corp., 330 N.E.2d 497 (Mass. App. 1975), and Sandusky Grain Co. v. Borden's
Condensed Milk Co., 214 Mich. 306, 183 N.W. 218 (1921), and Christopher & Simpson
Architectural Iron & Foundry Co. v. Steininger Constr. Co., 200 Mo. App. 33, 205 S.W. 278
(1918), and Exton Drive-In, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 436 Pa. 480, 261 A.2d 319 (1969), and
Texas Power & Light Co. v. Roberts, 187 S.W. 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (lost profit recovery
not allowed), with, e.g., S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58
Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (lost profit recovery allowed).
15. Compare, e.g., William B. Tanner Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), and
Tri-State Sys., Inc. v. Village Outlet Stores, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 81, 217 S.E.2d 399 (1975), and
Winston Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 284, 53 S.E. 885
(1906) (lost profit recovery not allowed), with, e.g., Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey
Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc. 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975), and Riley v. General Mills, Inc., 226 F.
Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 346 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1965) (lost profit
recovery allowed).
16. Compare, e.g., Gibson v. Hercules Mfg. & Sales Co., 80 Cal. App. 689, 252 P. 780
(1927), and Tonchen v. All-Steel Equip., Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 454, 300 N.E.2d 616 (1973), and
Barbier v. Barry, 345 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (lost profit recovery not allowed), with,
e.g., Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61 (Ist Cir. 1953), and Perma
Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 402 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 542 F.2d 111 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976) (lost profit recovery allowed).
17. The traditional goal in awarding damages for breach of contract is to award a sum
that will put the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed. This gives him the benefit of his bargain, that is, the
"profit" he would have made upon performance. This is said to give him his expectan-
cy and to protect his "expectation interest."
D. DOBBS, supra note i, § 12.1, at 786 (footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
329 (1932).
18. E.g., Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974); Mechanical Wholesale, Inc. v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 432
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1970); Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512 (1974);
Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340 (1955); cases allowing recovery cited in
notes 4, 5, 7-16 supra.
19. See text accompanying notes 100-17 infra. Antitrust cases that have influenced breach
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looking at closely comparable businesses, 20 relaxation of restrictions on
expert opinion evidence, 2 the growing sophistication of market analysis and
business forecasting, 22 a dissatisfaction with the niggardly "all-or-nothing"
approach inherent in the new business rule23 and a recognition of the
unfairness of allowing a class of defendants to breach their contracts with
impunity. 24
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CERTAINTY DOCTRINE
AND THE NEW BUSINESS RULE
Lost profits are usually considered to be "special damages," and
therefore must be specifically pleaded and proven with certainty. 25 This
certainty requirement was first announced and developed in lost profit cases,
initially in The Lively,26 in which a calculation of lost profits from the
illegal capture of a merchant vessel and its cargo was declared to entail
"utter uncertainty. "27 Griffin v. Colver28 elaborated more fully on the
certainty doctrine in response to a claim for lost profits occasioned by failure
to deliver a steam engine to a sawmill, stating that "[p]rofits which would
certainly have been realized but for the defendant's default are recoverable;
those which are speculative or contingent are not,' '29 and that the certainty
requirement was a "condition" upon the broad rule that plaintiff is entitled
to recover all his damages. 30
The most compelling reason for making an explicit requirement that the
cause and amount of damages be proven with certainty was probably to
obtain a device that would serve as a guide to or curb upon the discretion of
juries. 31 Claims for damages, being at law, were triable before juries, and
of contract analysis involving lost profits include Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972), on appealfrom remand determination of damages, 500 F.2d
659 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1974); Flintkote Co. v. LysfJord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F.
Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
20. The "yardstick measure" is discussed at text accompanying notes 123-49 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 193-213 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 176-91 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
24. See note 243 infra.
25. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 28, at 104 (1935). See generally
D. DOBBS, supra note 1, §3.2, at 13843 (discussion of the distinction between general and
special damages).
26. 15 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 8,403).
27. Id. at 635.
28. 16 N.Y. 489 (1858).
29. Id. at 491.
30. Id. at 494-95.
31. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 26, at 101.
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there was legitimate concern that juries would make awards based upon
inadequate evidence. The certainty requirement could thus be thought of as
the basis for defining a prima facie case and also for giving cautionary
instructions. As the case law developed, it was generally stated that the
requisite certainty was most difficult to achieve in actions for lost profits in
the commercial context because the contingencies of the marketplace made
the realization of profits inherently uncertain.32 Such claims were for the
most part denied as a matter of course without being submitted to the jury.
An early exception reflected the recognition that profits directly at-
tributable to the contract itself, as opposed to further transactions with third
parties, were susceptible of definite proof. 33 Masterton v. Mayor of Brook-
lyn,34 the seminal case making this distinction, termed the former "direct"
and the latter "collateral. '35 This distinction, helpful in determining when a
plaintiff had shown his loss with certainty, was later convoluted into a
notion that responsibility for collateral profits was somehow not a "part" of
the contract, and thus would allow a defaulting party to absolve himself for
the damages flowing from his actions simply beacuse the lost benefits would
have come from others rather than from his performance alone. 36 As an
exception allowing recovery of lost profits, the direct profits doctrine was
not applied to cases involving the destruction or prevention of the starting of
a new business, since such claims almost by definition are for profits that
would have been made from transactions with potential third party custom-
ers of the business, a class that may be as large as the general public.
32. See, e.g., Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891).
33. An example would be when buyer refuses to accept delivery of a machine he has
contracted to buy. Seller can easily show what profit he has lost by showing the expense of
production and selling costs and subtracting these from the contract price. Stricter proof would
be required from the buyer who seeks profits he would have made on the resale of the machine
had the seller not breached. See M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340,
346, 138 A.2d 350, 353-54 (1958); cf. McCormick, The Recovery of Damages for Loss of
Expected Profits, 7 N.C.L. REv. 231, 240 (1929) (greater uncertainty adheres to claims arising
out of frustrations of dealings with third parties).
34. 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
35. Id. at 68-69.
36. See Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1891). Some later
cases stated that profits must be direct in order to be recoverable. E.g., Merchants' Life Ins.
Co. v. Griswold, 212 S.W. 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 237 S.W. 232
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1922). The distinction survives today for the most part only as a difference
in proof requirements, not as a limitation on the right of recovery. See M & R Contractors &
Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 345-54, 138 A.2d 350, 353-58. It may be crucial,
however, to courts that are still concerned with the Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. 1854), requirement that special damages must have been foreseeable or within the contem-
plation of the parties to be recoverable. See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra; cf. Rivenbark
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 37 111. App. 3d 536, 539, 346 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1976) (notice of possible
collateral profits after execution of a contract will not satisfy the contemplation condition).
Masterton stated that profits on resale can not be "presumed to have entered into their
consideration at the time of contracting." 7 Hill at 68.
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Although the early cases seemed to establish a proof requirement that
was impossible for most claimants to satisfy, there was at no time a
generally accepted rule stating that lost profits as such could never be proven
with enough certainty to justify a recovery. 37 Bagley v. Smith ,38 an action
for wrongful dissolution of a partnership, recognized that evidence of past
profits was relevant to a determination of future profits. This acceptance of
the common sense principle of induction-that if all relevant conditions are
unchanged then one can know that the future will probably be like the
past39 -served as the foundation for the formulation of the rule, still preva-
lent, that is succinctly stated in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman :40
[T]he anticipated profits of a business are generally so dependent
upon numerous and uncertain contingencies that their amount is
not susceptible of proof with any reasonable degree of certainty;
hence the general rule that the expected profits of a commercial
business are too remote, speculative, and uncertain to warrant a
judgment for their loss. . . . There is a notable exception to this
general rule. It is that the loss of profits from the destruction or
interruption of an established business may be recovered where the
plaintiff makes it reasonably certain by competent proof what the
amount of his loss actually was. . . . The interest upon his capital
and the expenses of his business deducted from its income for a
few months or years prior to the interruption produce the custom-
ary monthly or yearly net profits of the business during that time,
and form a rational basis from which the jury may lawfully infer
what these profits would have been during the interruption if it had
not been inflicted. . . . He who is prevented from embarking a
new business can recover no profits, because there are no provable
data of past business from which the fact that anticipated profits
would have been realized can be legally deduced. 41
37. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1022, at 138; see Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce
Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891) (limiting recovery on substantive grounds rather than remedial
considerations); Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. at 491 (nothing in the nature of profits per se
prevents their allowance).
38. 10 N.Y. 489 (1853).
39. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 147-64
(1936). Contra, D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1748).
40. 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901). While this is a case under the Sherman Act rather than for
breach of contract, antitrust policy of recovery at the time had not yet diverged from that of
contract. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra. The rule as stated here applied with equal
force to the latter.
41. 111 F.2d at 98-99 (citations omitted). Compare Central Coal & Coke, 11l F. 96 (8th
Cir. 1901), with Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Constr. Co., 213 F.2d 16, 19 (8th
Cir. 1954), and Florida Outdoor, Inc. v. Steward, 318 So. 2d 414,415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
and Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423,426, 115 S.W. 2d 1097, 1099 (1938). Some
jurisdictions did not even recognize the history of past profits exception, see, e.g., Harper
Furniture Co. v. Southern Express Co., 148 N.C. 87, 89-90, 62 S.E. 145, 14546 (1908), but this
seems to have been aberrational.
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Thus the new business rule became crystallized as a rule of law. The history
of past profits exception, like the direct profits exception, was by definition
of no avail to claimants with an unestablished business. Only much later
would chinks begin to appear in the judicially erected barrier of the certainty
doctrine. 42
II. THE NEW BUSINESS RULE IN PRACTICE
The rule as stated in Central Coal & Coke is one of per se exclusion. It
is also characterizable, however, as a flexible rule bearing on the weight of
the evidence. Under the latter view past profits may be considered to be the
most persuasive evidence of what future profits would have been, but their
absence would not be fatal if the plaintiff could produce other evidence
tending to establish lost profits with certainty. As a doctine regulating the
sufficiency of evidence, the new business rule is helpful when instructing
the jury, but indefensible when used automatically to take the case away
from the jury--obviously it is fair to require a more extensive demonstration
of the factors bearing upon whether profits would have been made from a
plaintiff whose business never had any than from one whose business had.
43
It is in this sense, as an evidentiary consideration, that courts who have
acknowledged the authority of the new business rule, but nevertheless have
42. The application of the standard of certainty to deny recoveries of lost profits was a
peculiarly American development. Scottish law always allowed lost profits to be considered in
the estimate of damages. J. MAYNE & L. SMITH, MAYNE ON DAMAGES § 59 (1st Am. ed. H.
Wood 1880); see Oliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. 304, 52 N.W. 609 (1892); Wakeman v. Wheeler &
Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886) (early applications of the history of profits
exception in the selling agency context). Contra, Stern v. Rosenheim, 67 Md. 503, 10 A. 221
(1888). Cf. Johnson v. Railroad Co., 140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906) (plaintiffs could recover
in tort for the negligent burning of their crate-making factory the value of contracts already
entered into, but not for possible future contracts). Wakeman also indicated that evidence of
the business of the agencies that defendant later established would be admissible to prove the
amount of business plaintiff would have done had not his agency been wrongfully terminated,
101 N.Y. at 217, 4 N.E. at 271, an idea that was not generally accepted until much later.
Compare Wakeman, 101 N.Y. 205,4 N.E. 264 (1886), with Smith v. Eubanks & Hill, 72 Ga. 280
(1884). The narrow circumscription of the history of profits exception was also departed from in
Nash v. Thousand Islands Steamboat Co., 123 App. Div. 148, 108 N.Y.S. 336 (1908), a very
liberal case for its time. Plaintiff held concessions for souvenirs and parcel checking, on
defendant's six steamers for a term of three years. Plaintiff sought profits lost as a result of the
failure of one of the steamers to operate for more than one month of the term. Evidence was
properly taken concerning, among other things, profits earned during the same term on the
other boats (now known as the "yardstick" measure), the nature of the business, and plaintiff's
business ability. The court stated that "the fact that the jury would have difficulty in correctly
reaching a proper amount would not prevent their passing upon the question and exercising
their best judgment," id. at 158, 108 N.Y.S. at 343, indicating a greater faith in the discretion of
juries than was customary at the time. For general discussions of the certainty requirement, see
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, §§25-30; Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract,
70 COLUM. L. REV 1145, 1210-15 (1970).
43. Cf. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.3, at 154-55 (established-unestablished distinction
makes a good deal of sense as a matter of evidence, but not as a matter of substantive law).
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been willing to entertain claims within its purview, have spoken of the effect
of the lack of past profits. 44
The requirement that the amount of lost profits be proved with certain-
ty, of which the new business rule is a corollary, is the third condition in a
tripartite proof sequence that has been developed to limit the recovery of lost
profits.4' The first condition is that the breach must be the proximate cause
of the loss.46 The second is the Hadley v. Baxendale47 rule that special
damages must have been "foreseeable," that is, that they either are the
natural and inevitable result of the breach, or were within the "contempla-
tion of the parties" in that the defendant at the time of contracting had notice
of special circumstances making it likely that such damages would result
from nonperformance. 48 Foreseeability, although stated as a condition to
recovery, now is seldom a concern to most courts. 49 While Hadley may
have had some coherent meaning in the undeveloped commercial context in
which it arose, it now serves primarily as a source of confusion. Whatever
"foreseeable" may mean,50 it is a consideration that can be subsumed under
44. See Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1280, 1284
(N.D. Ga. 1970), modified sub nom. Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures Corp., 331
F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ga. 1971); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp.
103-05 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948) ("The
allowance of profits as damages is entirely a question of sufficiency of evidence."); Systems
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 692, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). A court could not
logically recognize the new business rule as a rule of law and then proceed to hear evidence
when there was no history of past profits forthcoming, because as a matter of law-if not of
reality-nothing that the plaintiff could offer would be relevant.
45. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.3, at 798.
46. Id.
47. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
48. Id. at 151; accord, Chain Belt Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 701, 714 (Ct. Cl.
1953); M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 348-49, 138 A.2d 350, 355
(1958); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.3, at 798 (recognizing the existence of the rule but
describing it as an "oversimplification"); Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Prob-
lems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 997-98 (1956). See generally D.
DOBBS, supra, § 12.3. Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199, 206 (1891), seems
to indicate that lost profits need only be shown to be foreseeable or certain, but this is probably
only a manifestation of the confused analysis in the opinion. The "contemplation of the
parties" strain of Hadley was the first "condition" imposed by the court in Griffin v. Colver,
16 N.Y. at 494-95; see text accompanying note 30 supra. See also note 36 supra.
49. Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634,640
(8th Cir. 1975), and For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 n.16(S.D.N.Y. 1972), note it in passing. Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 694, 160 P.2d 832, 841
(1945), is a rare case regarding contemplation of the parties as a dispositive issue.
50. Professor Dobbs suggests that foreseeability and contemplation of the parties are
merely code words for other policies concerning contract liability. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, §
12.3, at 804. He also states that courts have frequently treated contemplation of the parties and
certainty as the same problem. Id. § 12.3, at 814. Towles v. Cincinatti Tobacco Warehouse Co.,
146 Ky. 301, 142 S.W. 401 (1912), is instructive in this regard. In Towles, the court said that the
profits plaintiff lost by defendant's failure to loan money so that he could buy and sell
warehouse tobacco were not contemplated and were therefore speculative. Id. at 302, 142 S.W.
at 401. "Contemplated" is a foreseeability code word; "speculative" is a certainty code word.
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certainty analysis. It is enough to state the requirement that the defendant's
breach occasion the loss and that the loss be shown with a reasonable degree
of certainty. 51
If profits are to be recovered then the term must of course be defined.
The Restatement of Contracts defines profits simply as "the net pecuniary
gain from a transaction, the gross pecuniary gains diminished by the cosrof
obtaining them.'"52 This definition is equivalent to the accountant's defini-
tion of net income as "the excess of revenues over the expenses incurred,
plus or minus any gains or losses that are recognized during the period." ,53 It
is axiomatic that proof of gross income is insufficient. 54 In addition to
operating expenses such as the cost of goods sold and wages and salaries,
depreciation expense must usually be deducted from gross income as well.55
Older cases indicated that an allowance for interest on capital should be
made, 56 but this item is rarely mentioned in more recent cases. 57 One
problem that only arises in the case of a new business when an established
business enters a new geographic market or product line is the allocation of
overhead, that is, those fixed costs that are not easily assignable as costs per
unit. Consideration of overhead has been confused. 58 The preferable view is
not to require a deduction of a percentage of overhead costs when the
increased business would not actually have increased such costs (notwith-
standing that as an accounting convention overhead cost is allocated propor-
tionately to each unit or job in order to determine profit for accounting
purposes) because such costs are not "saved" when performance is not
forthcoming, but rather are allocated at a higher rate to business actually
done. 59
51. Cf. Comment, supra note 48, at 1020 (the requirement of foreseeability should be
abandoned).
52. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331, Comment b (1932).
53. M. GORDON & G. SHILLINGLAW, ACCOUNTINo: A MANAGEMENT APPROACH 12 (5th ed.
1974). For economists' views of profits, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 618-25 (9th ed. 1973).
54. E.g., Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 217, 527 P.2d 557, 562 (1974).
55. E.g., Lee v. Durango Music, 144 Colo. 270, 279, 355 P.2d 1083, 1088 (1960).
56. E.g., Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. at 98-99, quoted in text accom-
panying note 41 supra; Morrow v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 140 Mo. App. 200, 213, 123 S.W. 1034,
1039 (1909).
57. But cf. Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1977)
(subtracting percentage of return from investment bonds from percentage of return on yard-
stick measure business to arrive at a net percentage of return lost by reason of the breach).
58. Comment, supra note 48, at 1009.
59. See Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. -E., 542 F.2d 1053, 1062
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2973 (1977) ("Damages may be awarded on the basis of
gross profits when the breach does not significantly reduce overhead."); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376 (1927); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump
Co., 198 F.2d 416, 427 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). As an illustration, suppose
Slumb Contracting Company has office and salary expenses of X dollars per period whether it
completes N contracts or N-10 contracts. Slumb is prevented from performing a contracting job
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The determination whether a business is "new" or not is crucial when
to call it new would trigger the new business rule in its guise as a per se rule
of exclusion. Although this determination will necessarily vary with the type
of business involved, the decisions are essentially inconsistent. A vaudeville
theater in operation for fifteen weeks has been held to be an established
business, 6° while a distributorship for a milk product failed to qualify,
notwithstanding successful operation for several months. 61 A general defini-
tion that has been advanced is that "[a]n established business should be one
that is in actual operation long enough to give it permanency and recogni-
tion. ",62
It is often held that when an established retail or motel business moves
to a new location, it then becomes a new business at the new location;
profits formerly earned at the old location cannot be used as evidence of
future profits at the new location. 63 While in the majority of cases this
distinction may make some sense in that a retail store's or motel's location is
an important factor in the composition of its goodwill and helps determine
the type and number of customers it can attract, a change of location by
itself has no significant effect on a manufacturing or wholesale enterprise. It
has thus been held that moving a manufacturing operation to another plant
does not make it unestablished. 64
Even the expansion of capacity or capital improvement of a business
may invoke the "unestablished" epithet. 65 This seems entirely unjustified if
by a breach of contract. During the time this contract would have been performed, Slumb was
actually working on N-3 contracts with equal costs of performance. If it had been working
under the contract that had been breached, it would have been working on N-2 contracts of
equal cost. Overhead would be assigned per contract as -
x Xrather than
NT-3 N-2
by Slumb's accountant, but the actual amount of overhead-X-remained constant despite the
breach.
60. Brady v. Erlanger, 188 App. Div. 728, 177 N.Y.S. 301 (1919), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 563, 132
N.E. 889 (1921).
61. Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Prods. Co., 122 Wash. 220, 210 P. 366 (1922).
62. Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d 180, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
63. E.g., Knier v. Azores Constr. Co., 78 Nev. 20, 368 P.2d 673 (1962) (motel); Dieffen-
bach v. McIntyre, 208 Okla. 146, 254 P.2d 346 (1953) (beauty parlor); Sporleder v. Gonis, 68
Wis. 2d 554, 229 N.W. 2d 602 (1975) (jewelry store); cf. Jurcec v. Raznik, 104 Mont. 45, 64 P.2d
1076 (1937) (rooming house at old location continued operation so new location can be seen as
an expansion rather than a "new location").
64. Chain Belt Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 701, 717-18 (Ct. Cl. 1953); cf. Gardner
v. The Calvert, 253 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958) (replacement of a
vessel used for ferry and charter service did not involve undertaking a new venture).
65. See Bixby-Theirson Lumber Co. v. Evans, 167 Ala. 431,437-38, 52 So. 843,845 (1910)




the plaintiff can demonstrate that demand for his product or service was such
that the expanded capacity would be utilized to the same extent as his
existing capacity. 66 The expansion of an established manufacturing or
wholesale operation into a new geographic market presents an analogous
issue. Courts have usually found a sufficient nexus between performance in
the established territory and anticipated performance in the new territory to
justify considering the business as continuing to be an established one. 67 An
established business that enters a new product line, however, may be
deemed unestablished in that new product market.68 Some businesses, such
as farming, may be considered inherently "speculative," regardless of how
long the plaintiff has been in business.
69
At least one case has held that the sale of an established business
transforms it into an unestablished business in the hands of the new own-
ers. 70 This result may be defensible when the business in question is small
and dependent upon the skill, diligence and established goodwill of its
proprietors, but would be unjustified when the business involved is a large
firm and no changeover of management or firm strategy is contemplated.
There can be no comprehensive test for divining in all possible cases
whether a business is established. Because this is a question of law for the
court, 71 a judgment that a business is new may be no more than a reflection
of a judge's view that the plaintiff's claim is not substantiated by the
evidence, thus allowing him to keep the issue from going to the jury and to
award the defendant a victory by definition. When the new business rule is
not recognized, or is recognized only as a rule concerning the weight of the
66. Compare Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948), with Weiss v.
Revenue Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.J.L. 208, 182 A. 891 (1936).
67. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Aronowicz
v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1973); Madison Pictures, Inc. v.
Pictorial Films, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 302, 151 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960), plaintiff was
foreclosed from marketing his "Wax Seal" polish in 3,000 gas stations. These stations sold a
total of 4,707 cases of "Mac's" polish during the period. The products were comparable, but
Wax Seal outsold Mac's on the open market by a 3 to 1 margin. The Ninth Circuit in this
antitrust action accepted the reasoning that without the restriction the stations would have sold
14,121 cases of Wax Seal. Id. at 714-15. A more realistic figure would have been that 3,272
cases of Wax Seal and 1,636 cases of Mac's would have been sold during the period, because
demand for car polish could not be expected to vary with the number of brands available.
68. Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964); see Thrift Wholesale, Inc. v. Malkinillion Corp., 50 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Pa. 1943). Of
course, what is a new product may also be problematic, bringing into play such considerations
as different physical characteristics, and the availability of substitutes. Thrift drew a distinction
between cigarette vending machines and cigar vending machines. Id. at 1000.
69. See Rhodes v. Sigler, 44 Ill. App. 3d 375, 357 N.E.2d 846 (1976). Curiously, drilling for
oil is not usually put into this category, perhaps because geological evidence is more scientific
than measures of the vagaries of the marketplace. See cases cited at note 12 supra.
70. Kurtz v. Oremland, 33 N.J. Super. 443, 111 A.2d 100 (1954).
71. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
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evidence, then this somewhat scholastic, definitional word game is of little
importance. The question is restricted to whether the past history of the
business bears a close enough relation to a hypothetical future of the
business (which would have occurred had not the defendant breached his
contract) to justify looking at the past history as a guide; any change in the
character of the business would be a reason for adjustment-not preclusion
altogether.
The application of the new business rule as a per se rule has the virtue
of avoiding the problems presented when a court is willing to entertain
evidence of lost profits. For instance, evidence of lost profits when not
based on records of past profits is likely to be exceedingly complex,
entailing, among other things, expert testimony by accountants and business
economists, introduction of business records and such documents as market
surveys, testimony by competitors, complicated statistical analysis and
mathematical calculations of profit projections and present value. The possi-
bility of confusing the jury is quite apparent. 72 In addition, because the rule
is used to exclude evidence, it has the effect of avoiding expensive and
protracted litigation. 73
The most salutary effect of the new business rule, but one which is
never explicitly stated as a justification, is that it avoids holding the defend-
ant responsible for risks that are so great that they could not be fairly
allocated between the parties under any circumstances. 74 A promisor to a
contract only engages to part with his consideration. The expectation inter-
est of the promisee, however, which the law seeks to protect, will be greater
than the consideration which the promisor has promised to give when the
expectation is that a business will be formed that will bring to the promisee
profits from further transactions with third parties. 7 If the defendant is held
accountable for these profits then he is in effect paying for benefits that
would have flowed from the marketplace. Lost profit recoveries thus can be
punitive in the sense that they require one who has breached a contract to do
more than he would have had to do had he performed. The new business rule
may reflect an implicit policy judgment that this situation places an unfair
burden on the defendant and that the plaintiff is usually in the better position
72. Cf. T. MILNE, BUSINESS FORECASTING: A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 23 (1975) (statistical
analysis is so powerful a forecasting tool that the method may blind the user to deficiencies in
his data or his judgment).
73. Such litigation can indeed be protracted. See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich.
639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976). "'T]here were days and days of testimony.'" Id. at 645, 242
N.W.2d at 374 (quoting the trial court).
74. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 28, at 104.
75. That is, "collateral" profits. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra on the
distinction between direct and collateral profits.
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to anticipate and absorb this loss. 76 The obvious method of dealing with
such problems at the stage of forming the contract is always to include a
liquidated damages clause. 77
If there is indeed a tacit policy that the law should not place the danger
of excessive commercial risk upon promisors, then this purpose should be
made explicit and given some underpinning of reasoned analysis. Even if
this aim is desirable, however, the new business rule and the certainty
doctrine in general are both overbroad and underbroad as tools for its
realization. The certainty doctrine is underbroad in that if a plaintiff's
business has a history of past profits, then there is no curb on his recovering
his entire expectation interest-no matter how large-because he is deemed
to be able to prove his loss with certainty. Conversely, the new business rule
is overbroad in that without a history of past profits no profits can be
recovered, even if the ad damnum is minimal.78 A doctrine that purports to
deal with problems of proof cannot also satisfactorily deal with problems of
excessive verdicts; the two problems are not coextensive.
This point leads to consideration of the most severe shortcoming of the
certainty doctrine as traditionally applied: it supports a view that either the
full amount of damages must be proved with certainty and hence be recover-
able, or else nothing may be recovered. 79 Either the entire burden of risk is
shifted to the promisor or it is left entirely with the promisee. The certainty
doctrine and the new business rule in their harshest form permit neither
apportionment of the risk nor compromise whereby a plaintiff may recover
some amount even though his proof as a whole falls short of demonstrating
with certainty the entire loss he claims.80 While a plaintiff will in most cases
76. This concern may underlie such cases as Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 II1.
App. 542 (1932). Plaintiff sued Jack Dempsey for repudiation of an agreement to fight Harry
Wills for the heavyweight championship and offered testimony to show a loss of $1,600,000.
The court stated that "[t]he character of the undertaking was such that it would be impossible to
produce evidence of a probative character sufficient to establish any amount which could be
reasonably ascertainable by reason of the character of the undertaking." Id. at 549. This is
preposterous. Obviously plaintiff could have made a substantial amount of money from staging
a bout featuring the Manassa Mauler. This is probably an instance of a court invoking the
certainty doctrine as a subterfuge to avoid placing an intolerable onus on a defendant.
77. A related policy consideration is that if lessors and lenders are to be held liable for
profits lost due to breaches of leases and loan contracts, then they will pass along this increased
risk to the public in the form of higher rental and credit charges. Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396
Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976), is instructive in this regard. There defendant shopping center
developer was held liable in the amount of $200,000 for failure to put plaintiff into possession of
space in a shopping center so that plaintiff could open a "book and bottle" shop. Such a risk of
doing business could well chill further development of shopping centers. One might well
consider this result desirable, however. This concern does not extend to lenders. Recovery of
lost profits for failure to loan money is almost never allowed. See cases cited note 6 supra.
78. Cf. Comment, supra note 48, at 1016 ("the foreseeability test has been invoked to
preclude recovery when no large verdict problem was present").
79. See id. at 1020.
80. See Farnsworth, supra note 42, at 1213-14.
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be able to recover under an alternative measure of damages, this recovery
will rarely serve to fully protect his expectation interest.81
m. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
As loss of profits is a measure of special damages, some measure of
general damages will always be theoretically available as an alternative
when lost profits are not proved with certainty.8 2 In the case of destruction
of capital, this measure is the cost of the capital plus interest;8 3 for failure to
convey land or fixtures it is the difference between the contract price and the
fair market value of the property; 8' for delay in completion of construction,
conveyance, placement into possession under a lease or interruption of an
established business, it is the rental value of the property for the time it is
idle85 plus, occasionally, interest on the capital invested.86 When the breach
does not interfere with the use of any capital, only nominal damages may be
recovered. 87
Assuming thAt there is an ongoing profitable business or that one would
have been established, none of the general damages measures is adequate to
make an aggrieved party "whole." The difference between the fair market
value of property and its contract price will be zero in a perfectly competi-
tive market. Rental value, at most, only reflects operating expenses plus a
premium that a willing lessee would pay for the right to receive the profits
derived from the use of the property. Even when interest on capital is added
to rental value, the sum is still a lesser amount than the return from a
profitable business, because a "profitable" business almost by definition
makes a greater return on investment than the rate on a relatively risk-free
investment which is equivalent to the percentage of interest usually al-
lowed. 88 Some courts, recognizing that an established business is worth
more than its capital (that is, that its real value is equal to capital plus
goodwill) have allowed evidence of profits to be considered for the limited
81. See text accompanying notes 82-97 infra.
82. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.3, at 803; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 28, at
104; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331(2) (1932).
83. See The Lively, 15 F. Cas. at 635.
84. See Koch v. Godshaw, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 318 (1876).
85. See Consumers' Pure Ice Co. v. Jenkins, 58 Ill. App. 519 (1895); Evergreen Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955) (construction delays); Griffin v.
Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858) (lumber mill had to be shut down for a period when steam engine not
delivered); Harrison-Daniels Co. v. Aughtrey, 309 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (delay in
conveyance of land).
86. See Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 44 P. 621 (1896).
87. See Todd v. Keene, 167 Mass. 157, 45 N.E. 81 (1896) (breach of contract for single
theatrical performance).
88. If the interest rate happens to equal the return on capital of the business, then this
recovery would be equivalent to a recovery of lost profits.
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purpose of determining the fair value to the plaintiff of property or its use in
awarding general damages even though lost profits per se are not awarded.8 9
There is in reality very little difference between this approach to a general
damages measure and recovery of lost profits; to the user, the incremental
value of the property over its "market" value is simply a function of profit-
ability. These cases may also reflect a recognition that a general damages
measure may be no more susceptible to "certain" determination than lost
profits. 90 For instance, there is no more "certain" measure of the value of
an idle factory than the profits it generates during an equivalent period of
normal operation. The term "fair rental" in such a case is meaningless in
any other sense. Perhaps the reason why courts often continue to adhere to
the general damages measures of damages even when they are inadequate or
no more susceptible to certain proof than lost profits is that, as Professor
Dobbs suggests, courts "traditionally preferred to protect capital rather than
income. . . .Thus the rules opposed to lost profits recoveries are very
often not rules about certainty of proof at all; instead they are merely rules
reinforcing the general damages-value approach taken in other cases
"91
Even when a lost profit recovery is denied, out of pocket expenditures
incurred in preparation for performance of the contract may nevertheless be
recovered.92 One of the most confused issues in remedial law is whether
expenditures may be recovered in addition to lost profits. Some cases state
that the two remedies are exclusive and that to give both would be to award a
double recovery; 93 others state precisely the opposite. 94 As a general propos-
ition, the former view is patently absurd: "expenses" are by definition
distinct from profits as "net income." Expenses are deducted from revenues
to arrive at the profit figure. 95 The plaintiff would first necessarily have
89. See Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544 (1941); Lee Shops, Inc.
v. Schatten-Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1965); Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211 (1868); cf.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952)
(in determining damages, jury in antitrust case may consider evidence of profits earned before
and after sale of plaintiff's business forced as a result of defendant's illegal conspiracy).
90. Cf. Comment, supra note 48, at 1015 (it is often unclear whether a court is awarding
the value of a lease or lost profits); Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost
Profits, supra note 1, at 325 (recovery of fair rental value of a business is very close to recovery
of profits).
91. D. Donas, supra note 1, § 3.3, at 154 (footnote omitted).
92. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 200 Or. 513,491 P.2d 992(1971); Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 1300 (1951).
93. See Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chem. Co., 218 F.2d 104, 112 (3d Cir. 1955); William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103-05 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d
1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948); Johnson v. Wright, 175 Minn. 236, 220 N.W.
946 (1928); McCormick, supra note 33, at 246.
94. United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 344 (1884); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d
368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
95. See the discussion of the meaning of "profits" at text accompanying notes 52-59
supra.
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retrieved his expenses before any profits would have been realized. If he
recovers his "profits" but not his expenses, then he is in effect recovering
only some of the expenses and none of the profits (assuming that expenses
are greater than profits) that he has lost, something far less than his
expectation interest. Therefore, expenditures actually incurred should al-
ways be recoverable in conjunction with lost profits, subject only to a
possible exception when the expenditure is more accurately classified as a
capital outlay. Expenditures ordinarily are capitalized when they produce an
asset; they are expensed when they are consumed in the production of
income. 96 A recovery of capital costs would not be proper if the plaintiff has
in his possession an asset "bought" with those expenditures. 97 Otherwise,
expenses should be recovered because the income they would have helped to
produce was never realized.
IV. MITIGATING DOCTRINES FOR LOST PROFIT RECOVERIES IN GENERAL
If the doctrine of certainty were carried to its logical extreme then lost
profits could never be recovered. Of necessity, certain qualifying doctrines
have been developed to soften its impact. Some are applicable to lost profit
cases in general; others apply only in the new business context. The most
important of the general doctrines is that it is enough to merit recovery if the
existence of lost profits is shown with "reasonable" certainty.9" Just what
96. See generally M. GORDON & G. SHILLINGLAW, supra note 53, at 339-55.
97. If the market value of the asset is less than its cost, however, the difference should be
recoverable. As an illustration, suppose B obtains a promise from Hamburger, Incorporated,
that they will grant him a franchise on the condition that B provide a site with a building built to
Hamburger's specifications. B has the building constructed on a lot that he already owns.
Hamburger reneges. B still has a building-a capital asset. But since the building has trade-
marked trappings suitable only for a "Hamburger Stand," B cannot sell the building and the lot
without the franchise for even as much as it cost him to build it. Since he cannot retrieve this
loss from the marketplace, he should be allowed to recover it from Hamburger in the courts.
Cf. id. at 274 (generally accepted accounting principle that inventory should be valued at cost
or market, whichever is lower). In promissory estoppel cases, expenses may be recovered in
protection of the reliance interest, but not lost profits. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684
(D.C. Cir. 1948).
98. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927)
(antitrust) ("It is sufficient if a reasonable basis of computation is afforded .... "); Standard
Machinery Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61, 64 (Ist Cir. 1953) ("the basic question [is]
whether a prospective loss of net profits has been shown with reasonable certainty"); William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d
1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948) (antitrust) ("In every case the question is
whether the data of which the evidence consists is such that a just and reasonable estimate can
be drawn from it, so that a verdict will not be based on nmere speculation or guesswork, it being
fully recognized that it is not necessary to show with absolute accuracy how much profit would
have been earned."); Brenneman v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 260 Or. 513, 517 n.l, 491 P.2d 992, 994
n.1 (1971) ("Although the courts have sometimes refused to permit recovery of lost profits on
the ground that the profits of a new business are necessarily too speculative . . ., others have
recognized that the question in each case is simply whether or not prospective profits can be
proved with reasonable certainty."); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS § 331(1) (1932) ("Damages
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"reasonable" means in a particular situation is difficult to pinpoint, but it is
helpful to conceive of all the other general qualifying doctrines as corollaries
of the fundamental axiom of reasonable certainty. Professor McCormick
catalogues these doctrines as follows:
(a) If the fact of damage is proved with certainty, the extent or
amount may be left to reasonable inference.
(b) Where the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of
proof of damage, he cannot complain of the resulting uncer-
tainty.
(c) Mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damage is not
fatal.
(d) Mathematical precision in fixing the exact amount is not re-
quired.
(e) If the best evidence of the damage of which the situation
admits is furnished, this is sufficient.
(f) The plaintiff may recover the value of his contract, and this
may be measured by the value of the expected profits.
(g) Profits may sometimes be proved as evidence of the damages,
when they would not be directly recoverable. 99
In considering these doctrines and the extent to which the rule of
certainty has been relaxed in breach of contract cases, it is important to bear
in mind the influence of antitrust decisions upon contract analysis and to ask
whether the differing substantive policies of antitrust and tort law on the one
hand, and contract law on the other, should mandate different remedial
treatment.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. ,i00 Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. 101 and Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. 102 are the three most important Supreme Court antitrust
decisions that have been most often adopted (usually without an attempt to
distinguish between antitrust and contract1 3) as authority for awarding lost
profits in breach of contract cases. Kodak, in addition to phrasing the rule of
"reasonable" certainty in a liberal manner,"0 4 also institutionalized the
notion that "a defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the
are recoverable for losses caused or for profits and other gains prevented by the breach only to
the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating this amount in money with
reasonable certainty.").
99. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 27 (footnotes omitted). Items (c) and (d) make
essentially the same point, and are no more than tautologous rephrasings of reasonable certain-
ty. Item (f) is of course true, but "may" means "might" here rather than "will." On item (g)
see text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
100. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
101. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
102. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
103. For example, Professor McCormick cites Story Parchment for several of the proposi-
tions listed in the textual quotation at note 99 supra.
104. 273 U.S. at 379; see note 98 and accompanying text supra.
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ascertainment of the precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled
to complain that they cannot be measured with the same exactness and
precision as would otherwise be possible."1 5 Story Parchment conjured up
the idea that "[t]he rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages
applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those
damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in
respect of their amount." 10 6
These rules, which have the effect either of relaxing the plaintiff's
burden under the certainty doctrine or of shifting the burden to the defendant
after a minimal prima facie showing are clearly derived from tort analysis
rather than contract.10 7 A tort victim, like the victim of an antitrust violation,
is not in a position to anticipate the consequences of the tortfeasor's wrong
and to allocate the risk of damages that may flow therefrom. A party to a
contract, however, ordinarily has such an opportunity to allocate anticipated
risks. Therefore the standard of certainty in tort cases has traditionally been
more relaxed than that of contract.10 8 In addition, antitrust policy has as its
primary goal the protection of the public rather than the protection of private
rights as in contract. Finally, antitrust treble damages are punitive and are
intended to have a deterrent effect; contract damages are merely compensa-
tory. 109 Thus it may be that the degree of uncertainty that is acceptable is a
function of the relative strength of the underlying substantive legal policy
rather than a reflection of any inherent problems of proof. The more
reprehensible a defendant's behavior, the more the law will feel justified in
resolving doubts against him concerning the consequences of the behav-
ior." 0
Another problem with absorbing the antitrust rules of damages meas-
urement into contract cases is the open ended manner in which the rules are
phrased. The Kodak rule, with its emphasis on the wrongdoer, would, if
carried to its extreme, shift the burden of uncertainty entirely to the defen-
dant. The Story Parchment rule, if likewise extended, would eradicate the
requirement that the amount of damages be proved with certainty and would
leave only the requirement that the defendant's breach be the proximate
cause of the loss suffered."' The antitrust cases themselves, however, did
105. 273 U.S. at 379; accord, Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265.
106. 282 U.S. at 562; accord, Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 267-68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
107. Cf. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265 (rule that the wrongdoer should bear the risk of
uncertainty is an ancient principle not limited to antitrust actions); Story Parchment, 202 U.S.
at 563-64 (discussion of rule in tort cases).
108. See, e.g., Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 192 So. 895 (La. Ct.
App. 1939).
109. However, lost profit recoveries in contract can be said to have a punitive aspect. See
text following note 75 supra.
110. See D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.3, at 152-53.
I11. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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not carry these rules to their limits. Kodak involved an established retailer
who was unable to carry defendant's line of goods due to the latter's refusal
to sell at a retailer's discount. The only uncertainty in the measurement of
damages was as to the estimate of the additional cost of handling the
goods. 112 Plaintiff in Bigelow owned an established motion picture theater.
His claim was for loss of earnings for a five year period due to a refusal by
defendants to supply him with first-run pictures. The only uncertainty was
whether lost profits could be estimated on the basis of a comparison of
receipts for a period preceding the unlawful action with receipts during the
period of unlawful action, when the theater showed only later-run pic-
tures. 113 Plaintiffs in both Kodak and Bigelow had established businesses
and both could estimate the elements of damages on the basis of past
experience. Therefore, the relief accorded in these early antitrust decisions,
in contrast to the Courts' language, did not actually represent a radical
departure from the common law rule of reasonable certainty. 114 Although
later antitrust cases have moved toward a more liberal view of recovery, 115
and in at least two instances have awarded lost profits for destruction of a
business that never was profitable, 116 it has been the contract cases in which
the courts have seized upon the dicta from the early Supreme Court antitrust
decisions to justify profit recoveries for businesses that are never estab-
lished. 117 Thus it may be that courts may have been predisposed to make
112. 273 U.S. at 376.
113. 327 U.S. at 262-64, 266. The Court also considered evidence of the "yardstick"
measure, comparing plaintiff's receipts with those of comparable competitors during the same
period, but seemed to consider the "before and after" demonstration sufficient. Id. at 257-58,
266.
114. The roots of the antitrust damages doctrines can actually be traced to older contract
cases. Compare Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562, with Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg.
Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 215-17, 4 N.E. 264, 270-71 (1886); compare Kodak, 273 U.S. 359 (1927),
with Brady v. Erlanger, 188 App. Div. 728, 177 N.Y.S. 301 (1919), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 563,
132 N.E. 889 (1921), and Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lee Farm Oil Co., 230 S.W. 518, 521 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921).
115. See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1020 (1971); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957); Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law, 88 PA. L. REV.
511, 517 (1940).
116. Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
419 U.S. 987 (1974); William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
117. See, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447, 455 (2d Cir. 1977);
Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565 (2d Cir. 1970); Perma Research & Dev. Co.
v. Singer Co., 402 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 987 (1976); For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1280, 1284
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Blanchard v. Makinster, 137 Or. 58, 60, 1 P.2d 583, 584-85 (1931); Ferrell v.
Elrod, 63 Tenn. App. 129, 146-47, 469 S.W.2d 678, 689 (1971). But see Evergreen Amusement
Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955); cf. Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535
S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (evidence held speculative even as to the fact of
damage).
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inroads upon the new business rule for other reasons and have cited the
antitrust opinions simply for their supporting language.
The doctrine that it is sufficient if a plaintiff offers the best evidence
possible under the circumstances has likewise proven in practice not to be as
radical as it would seem. Obviously in some factual circumstances the best
evidence available will not be enough to cross the threshold of certainty.
Rather, the doctrine has been utilized to legitimate awards based upon
evidence other than past profits when the defendant's conduct has prevented
entry into a market, 1 8 if the data is probative, convincing and as detailed
and complete as can be expected. This evidence may often include evidence
of the plaintiff's experience and capacity to handle additional business,
records of closely comparable businesses and expert testimony. 19 The
converse of this doctrine-that an offer of less than the best evidence
available will not satisfy the burden of certainy-has been of more impor-
tance. The converse is applied when a plaintiff offers a general estimate of
lost profits without introducing business records upon which an estimate
could be founded 120 or when his estimates are based upon assumptions not
supported by the evidence.121
V. MITIGATING DOCTRINES FOR NEW BUSINESS CASES
The doctrines that mitigate the effects of the strict certainty rule in
relation to recovery of lost profits in general apply to recovery of lost profits
for unestablished businesses as well. Courts allowing such recoveries have
stated in effect that if the proof of damages issue is framed in terms of
"reasonable" certainty, then there can be no rigid adherence to the new
business rule.122 Because a court must examine some sort of evidence other
118. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952); William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), affd,
169 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948); cf. Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864,
229 P.2d 348 (1951) (proof of damages for loss of goodwill due to defective paint).
120. See Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 11 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901); Cook Indus., Inc.
v. Carlson, 334 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Myrick v. Miller, 256 So. 2d 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Peoples Moss Gin Co. v. Jenkins, 270 So. 2d 285 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Rambo v.
Galley, 188 Neb. 692, 199 N.W.2d 14 (1972); Douglas Constr. Corp. v. Mazama Timber Prods.,
Inc., 256 Or. 107, 471 P.2d 768 (1970); Gilmartin v. Stevens Inv. Co., 43 Wash. 2d 289, 261 P.2d
73 (1953); cf. DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1960) (defendants in action for
breach of covenant not to compete could not complain that plaintiff's estimate of the profit
margin on a contract he lost to defendent was too speculative, when defendant did not show
what profit was actually realized).
121. See Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Tenn.
1974).
122. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368,392(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957); Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 1953) ("[a]s we
see it a sharp line of distinction should not be drawn between old and new businesses, but
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than that of past profits in the case of an unestablished business, there have
of necessity developed some generally accepted principles concerning the
types of evidence that can be introduced to demonstrate the probability that
profits would have been earned. While these types of evidence have been
most prominent in the new business cases, they have also been used as
additional supporting data for businesses with a history of past profits.
The method of proving lost profits (other than by a history of past
profits) that has achieved the most recognition is the "yardstick" meas-
ure: 123 a comparison with the performance of businesses as similar to the
plaintiff's as possible in size, location and nature during the time period in
question. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 124 was one of the first
important decisions to recognize the yardstick measure. As evidence of
earnings lost during a five year period when his theater was wrongfully
prevented from booking motion pictures on a first-run basis, plaintiff of-
fered a comparison between his actual earnings and the earnings of his
competitor during the same period." The Supreme Court did not rest its
decision on this comparison; rather, it relied upon the comparison between
plaintiff's receipts during the period in which he could book first-run
pictures with the diminished receipts during the period in which he could get
only later runs, perhaps because the Court viewed plaintiff's theater as
superior to its competitor in location, equipment and patron attractive-
ness. 126 The Court nevertheless stated that the two approaches to proving
damages were not mutually exclusive.127
The yardstick measure was used in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc. ,128 a case similar to Bigelow on its facts with the important
difference that plaintiff's theater was new, thus making a before and after
comparison impossible. Plaintiff offered an estimate of damages calculated
by taking the average volume of five competing theaters during the damage
period in downtown Philadelphia and deducting an estimated operating
recourse should be had in both situations to the basic question whether a prospective loss of net
profits has been shown with reasonable certainty."); S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros.
Parking-W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 184-85, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49 (1976); Fera v. Village
Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 645, 242 N.W.2d 372, 374 (1976); Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn. App.,
129, 145-46, 469 S.W.2d 678, 686 (1971).
123. See generally Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 929 (1974); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1346 A, at 249 (3d
ed. 1966); Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, supra note 1, at 318-
19.
124. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
125. Id. at 257-58.
126. Id. at 258-59.
127. Id. at 260.
128. 69 F. Supp. 103 (E. D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
811 (1948).
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Cost. 129 The calculation was rejected for the reason that plaintiff's theater
was in an inferior location and had no established goodwill. The court,
however, was willing to use one of the five theaters that also had a poor
location as a yardstick, and then make adjustments downward in con-
sideration of the location, lack of goodwill, lack of air conditioning, a
contingent increase in rental provided for in the lease and the fact that the
yardstick's earning figures were only for the last three months of the damage
period, when the war boom had created a rise in movie attendance.130
The yardstick comparison has also been used for the narrower purpose
of proof of expenses. Plaintiff in Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.13 1 forced out of
his service station business, correlated his average monthly expense data
with three other service stations.13 2 The yardstick measure probably be-
comes more reliable as the industry of which the business is a part ap-
proaches the perfectly competitive (such as commercial fishing 33 and the
cultivation of crops134). The plaintiff can be assured of finding a market for
all he can produce at the same price as his competitors.
Two elements are common to these yardstick cases: (1) the presence of
an undifferentiated product (one brand of gasoline, onions, a species of fish
and first-run motion pictures considered as a group) that, if sold at retail,
commonly may be purchased from a large number of outlets of a fairly
standard size having fixed costs that do not vary substantially among
competitors; and (2) the problems of determining whether the plaintiff's
business could capture a market share equal to its closest competitors are not
of great concern. When these factors are present, the operations of
competitors can be considered roughly equivalent to what the plaintiff's
would have been, and adjustment for any apparent differences can be
accurately made. Any uncertainty is further lessened when the comparison
is, as in Lehrman, of expenses only, 35 since expenses are but one
constituent variable in the calculation of profits. 136
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id. at 107-08. But see Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104,
121 N.E. 756 (1919). In Photoplay, Justice Cardozo emphasized the different tastes in pictures
on behalf of the public and the fact that quality counts. Id. at 108-09, 121 N.E. at 757-58. While
it is true that every individual film is unique, and that there is wide fluctuation among them in
profitability, it is also true that over a long period with screenings of numerous films these
differences should even out at the box office.
131. 500 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1974).
132. Id. at 668.
133. See Blanchard v. Makinster, 137 Or. 58, 1 P.2d 583 (1931).
134. Malone v. Hastings, 193 F. I (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 618 (1912); cf. Gardner
v. The Calvert, 253 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958); Fera v. Village Plaza,
Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976) (testimony of competitors allowed). Contra,
Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955).
135. See text accompanying notes 131 & 132 supra.
136. See generally text accompanying notes 52-59 supra (definition of profits).
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Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc. ,137 is a case using the yardstick
measure in a context where these equalizing factors were not present. In an
action for wrongful termination of a franchise to distribute Peugeot auto-
mobiles in the far western states, the court permitted the introduction of
plaintiff's comparison with Volvo sales in the same states during the same
period. The comparison was made between businesses selling differentiated
products on a large scale with varying costs and no competitors in the same
product line and geographic market. 138 This comparison, however, was not
the main evidence upon which lost profits were calculated. 139
The Autowest court also utilized a related standard: looking at the
performance of plaintiff's successor.1" The chief difference between this
and the yardstick measure is that the time periods compared are consecutive
rather than concurrent, although the successor's period of performance may
overlap with the damage period, as distinguished from the period of actual
performance by the plaintiff. This measure is most useful in cases of breach
of an exclusive distributorship1 41 or concession 142 situation, in which the
plaintiff would have had a closed territory in the line of goods. This method
is also applicable in the case of breach of a construction contract or
subcontract in which the job to have been done is finite, the work is
indivisible and costs would not be expected to vary significantly in relation
to the identity of the performing party.143 If the interest is such that the
breaching party could have established more than one other agency, as in the
case of a nonexclusive distributorship, then it would be impossible to equate
the plaintiff's projected market share-and hence the volume of business
done-with that of the plaintiff's successor. 14 If the claim is for profits lost
by reason of delay in the opening or reopening of the plaintiff's business,
then looking at the plaintiff's performance following the delay for a time
137. 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
138. Id. at 563-67.
139. Ten year income and sales projections received the most weight. There were also
comparisons with the performance of plaintiff's successor and Peugeot's New England opera-
tions. Id. at 567.
140. Id.
141. See id.; Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205,217, 4 N.E. 264,271
(1886).
142. Macke Co. v. Pizza, Inc., 259 Md. 479, 270 A.2d 645 (1970).
143. Cf. Verret v. Leagjeld, 263 Or. 112, 501 P.2d 780 (1972) (defendant in suit for breach
of a subcontract for excavation, site preparation and fill work called the subcontractor who did
the work to testify that he had lost money on the job; this evidence was held not to be
dispositive, because plaintiff could have commenced work earlier and consequently have had
better weather conditions). But cf. Smith v. Eubanks & Hill, 72 Ga. 280 (1884) (error to take
into account profits made by successors in possession of a lease of a grocery store and bar, in
part because the successors may have been better businessmen).
144. See Friedman v. McKay Leather Co., 179 Cal. 566, 178 P. 139 (1919).
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equal to the time lost has the obvious, additional advantage of restricting the
comparison to the same business that is the subject of the suit. 145
Another variation upon the yardstick measure is looking at other
businesses operated by the plaintiff when those businesses are essentially of
the same type as the one in question. This has been done chiefly in the area
of franchised fast food outlets where each franchise is essentially fungible,
all benefit from a program of national advertising and each is uniformly
profitable.1n6 A possible problem with the validity of such a comparison
arises when the contemplated outlet would be located close enough to an
existing outlet for there to be intrabrand competition and consequent uncer-
tainty as to what the contemplated outlet's share of the market for the
franchised product in the competitive territory would be. 147
145. See United Elec. Coal Cos. v. Rice, 22 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. III. 1938); CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 1023, at 151-52. Contra, Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead,
206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955); Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119
N.E. 227 (1918). Even though a subsequent profit record is simply the mirror image of a past
profit history (and indeed may be more probative than a profit history preceding the breach),
see United Elec. Coal Cos. v. Rice, 22 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. II1. 1938), remarkably few courts
have been willing to award lost profits on such a basis.
146. Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973),
presented what was probably the best conceivable circumstances for recourse to this method.
McDonald's had it their way in a suit for malicious interference with contract rights asking
damages for prevention of the erection of a franchise establishment on a particular site.
Evidence was presented through the testimony of McDonald's marketing research manager and
the record keeper for the McDonald's Eastern Regional Office of the uniformity of procedures
at all of plaintiff's restaurants, uniformity of national advertising, uniform quality control,
earnings and expense figures from all franchises within a twenty-five mile radius, and the fact
that not one of hundreds of such restaurants had failed. Thus, almost all uncertain variables
were eliminated from the damages equation. Id. at 213, 308 A.2d at 483; see Gordon v. Indusco
Mgmt. Corp., 164 Conn. 262, 320 A.2d 811 (1973) (contemplated "Heap Big Beef" operation is
comparable to an outlet in another town); cf. S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-
W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (plaintiff operated several other
profitable parking garages). But see Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc., 326 F.
Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified sub nom. Eastern Fed. Corp. v. Avco-Embassy Pictures
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding damages allowable for failure to distribute
film "The Graduate" to plaintiff's two established theaters, but disallowing damages for a
newly-opened theater); Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amusement Co., 260
Mass. 265, 157 N.E. 532 (1927) (holding a recovery based upon showings of wax figures in two
other cities too speculative). Avco-Embassy Pictures is distinguishable in that "The Graduate"
would have run only during the initial startup period when the new theater in fact suffered
losses, while the established theaters continued to operate at a profit. 326. F. Supp. at 1285.
Also, no theater of plaintiff's did show the film, so there was no measure to compare that was
free of the interference complained of. An interesting question is, if plaintiff could have proven
that "The Graduate" would have attracted a greater volume of patronage in a constant ratio for
any theater, then whether plaintiff should have been allowed to recover such of his losses as he
would have certainly recouped, even though he would not have earned profits from the
showing.
147. See Mullen v. Brantley, 213 Va. 765, 768-70, 195 S.E.2d 696, 699-700 (1973) (noting
that while Shakey's Pizza Parlors had in general been highly successful, there had been failures
where-as here--outlets were located too close to each other); cf. Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960) (interbrand
competition).
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Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ,148 one of the most liberal of
the new business cases, used an analogous but somewhat more arbitrary
measure of comparison. Plaintiffs, one-half owners of an existing liquor
distributorship, sued a distiller for failure to supply them with a new
distributorship in another location which was to have equaled in value
plaintiffs' investment in the existing distributorship. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit accepted, virtually without discussion, an estimate of
damages calculated as the same percentage of return on the old distributor-
ship in the preceding year multiplied by the dollar value of the plaintiffs'
interest in the old distributorship (which by the terms of the agreement
would roughly equal their investment in the contemplated distributorship),
computed for the ten year estimated "life" of the new distributorship. 149
This result is defensible in the sense that plaintiffs would not rationally have
consented to give up their interest in the old distributorship unless in their
business judgment the new distributorship would be at least as profitable.
Nevertheless, the factors that weighed in their decision should have been
considered in the opinion. A crucial question would be whether there were
any economies of scale involved so that a distributorship with only half the
capitalization of the yardstick would be expected to earn a lower return.
Even though the plaintiff may not be in a position to offer evidence of
records of similar businesses that he or others have operated, any experience
that he may have had in a similar line of business is nevertheless usually
given some weight.15 0 This evidence is never sufficient by itself to allow
recovery; it is relevant only to show managerial or other operational skill,
one factor bearing on possible profitability of a business, and provides no
basis for a wholistic estimate of damages in the way that a yardstick measure
does. The converse, which has been applied as a rationale for denying
recovery, is that lack of experience will weigh against a plaintiff.15 1
148. 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977).
149. Id. at 454-55. An allowance for percentage of return on income from investments in
bonds was subtracted from the percentage of return figure. The gross amount was also reduced
to present value. The court seemed to have put the burden on defendant to come forward with
what it-considered to be a more certain measure of damages-such as the profits of an existing
distributorship-if it objected to the measure offered by plaintiff. This is a good example of the
antitrust damages doctrines let loose in a contracts case. The Second Circuit cited all three
antitrust decisions discussed in text accompanying notes 100-17 supra. Id. at 455.
150. See Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chem. Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955); Standard Mach. v.
Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61 (lst Cir. 1953); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811
(1948); S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1973);
Johnson v. Wright, 175 Minn. 236, 220 N.W. 946 (1928).
151. See Putnam v. Lower, 236 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1956); Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); American Oil Co. v. Lovelace, 150 Va. 624, 143 S.E. 293 (1928); cf.
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If past profits are considered to provide the only permissible foundation
for calculating lost profits, the rate of past return might likely be considered
to set the outside limit for recovery of future profits; that is, the plaintiff
cannot be heard to claim that he would have earned more during the period
represented by the breach than he had previously. The more charitable view
is that an expected increase in the rate of return may be acknowledged in
estimating damages when there are indications of such a trend, as for
instance a steady growth in sales volume152 or the fact that the market was
underdeveloped at the time of breach and the plaintiff would have had the
capacity to develop it further. 153 There is no reason why this principle
should not also be applied to businesses that have never shown a profit if it is
demonstrated that the business is reducing its losses at a rate that would
indicate future profitability or, if the breach occurs during the startup period
when the business would be expected to be operating at a loss, its prospects
for success could be forecast as otherwise favorable based upon objective
criteria. 154
In determining future profitability courts have sometimes been willing
to rely on defendant's representations that the ventures would be profitable.
Flintkote v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957)
(plaintiffs' experience as salesmen for a tile company was of scant weight when they attempted
to start their own tile company and sought damages based on what they had formerly made on
sales commissions).
152. See Pacific Scientific Co. v. Glassey, 245 Cal. App. 2d 831, 54 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1966);
cf. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 427 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837
(1952) (expert testimony for Sherman Act counterclaim in patent infringement suit that growth
curve of product would have continued upward over the period in question).
153. See Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 191, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348-49 (1955).
154. See Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614,620-21,518 P.2d 512,517 (1974); cf.
Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d at 557 (significant that although plaintiff's successor
to automobile distributorship did sustain losses, its sales rose at a rate virtually equalling
plaintiff's ten year sales projection). In For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F. Supp.
1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), plaintiff corporation was formed to publish and market children's books.
Its first project was to market "pop-up" books. Defendant printer's product proved defective.
The court held that damages for loss of profits on the order were proven with sufficient
certainty through evidence that the new company was in readiness to market the books, had
already received substantial orders, and a sales promotion campaign indicated a probability of
successful distribution of most of the order. Damages were calculated on the assumption that
75% of the order would have been sold. d. at 1285. Thus, while there was not even a pattern of
growth due to the newness of the venture, the court nevertheless was willing to extrapolate
from preparations preceding actual sales to a conclusion as to what amount of sales would have
been achieved. This situation differs from the problems presented by a typical new business
case in that the claim for damages referred to a specific, finite amount of goods rather than the
prevention of the establishment of the business as an entity, and was therefore inherently
limited in amount. Compare For Children, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), with
Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S.
987 (1974). In addition, the premarketing activity made possible a detailed estimate of overhead
expenses, thus eliminating one element of uncertainty often present in new business cases.
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The expressions may be found in the contract itself'55 or in parol communi-
cations between the parties. 15 6 Such representations serve as an equitable
estoppel rather than inherently certain measures of damages in that they are
statements which the plaintiff has relied upon to his detriment. 15 7 In Perma
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co. ,158 however, a determination
by defendant that the venture would be profitable was recognized as cogent
evidence of lost profits even though plaintiff did not rely on this informa-
tion, when the determination was the result of a study undertaken for the
purpose of deciding whether to enter the venture. 159
The district court's opinion in Perma Research is an express affirma-
tion of the view that the information compiled and relied upon by busi-
nessmen in making a contractual commitment decision may be a reliable
indication of the probable profitability of the venture that the resulting
contract contemplates, especially when the study is undertaken without an
eye toward litigation. 160 The Second Circuit in Autowest161 adopted this
155. See Burks v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 183 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1950) (maximum and minimum
amounts in an agreement to sell gasoline to a service station reflected what defendant's
representative thought the plaintiff could sell in one year). But see Universal Commodities, Inc.
v. Weed, 449 S.W.2d 106, 113-14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
156. See Buxbaum v. G.H.P. Cigar Co., 188 Wis. 389, 206 N.W. 59 (1925) (cigar manufac-
turer terminated an exclusive distributorship after three years; plaintiff distributor had never
made a profit, but defendant had represented to him that his startup work would bear fruit in the
fourth year). Contra, Universal Commodities, Inc. v. Weed, 449 S.W.2d 106, 113-14 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969) (prospectus that defendant offered plaintiff purporting to estimate the future profit
of a processing plant in an attempt to induce plaintiff to take over the plant held too specula-
tive).
157. Cf. text accompanying note 105 supra (wrongdoer whose actions have rendered
difficult the ascertainment of damages shall not be heard to claim that damage cannot be proven
with certainty).
158. 402 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d Ill (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 987 (1976).
159. Plaintiff assigned a patented anti-skid device to defendant, who was to perfect,
manufacture and market it in the automobile aftermarket. Defendant's own engineers found the
device to be perfectible. Defendant's market expert compiled sales projections in making a
report on whether to enter the contract with plaintiff. Defendant entered the contract in reliance
on these figures projecting sales for five years of a ten year contract. "If Singer's experts
judged [the sales projections] sufficiently reliable to justify entering a contract without further
market analyses, then I have no reason to challenge their accuracy." Id. at 901. The trial judge
adopted the figures in the sales projections for purposes of computing damages. Singer thus
was the victim of its own careful business practices. One reason why Singer's market analysis
would be entitled to so mubh weight is that meeting the sales projection depended entirely on its
own initiative. Nevertheless, Perma Research is probably the most liberal new business case to
date. The anti-skid device itself was never perfected and did not meet established standards of
the auto industry. Thus there was inherent technological uncertainty raising doubts as to
whether the device would ever reach the market. Compounding this uncertainty was the fact
that the aftermarket would have had to be developed from scratch, there being no comparable
devices available for the aftermarket at that time.
160. See id.
161. 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
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attitude of deference to products of the businessman's skill and judgment in
considering the weight to accord records of sales and income projections
made by plaintiffs prior to the breach. 162
The iconoclastic development in the new business cases that promises
to sound the death knell for the traditional new business rule is the increas-
ing acceptance of business economists' expert testimony based upon studies
produced through the techniques of business forecasting and expressly
prepared for litigation. While such testimony may incorporate many of the
more familiar types of information discussed above, the information will
ordinarily be synthesized in a more rigorous and coherent manner when
presented by an expert economist. 163 This synthesis may take the form of a
hypothetical model constructed from a wide range of relevant data and
assumptions that take into account the interrelation between factors that
could not be considered without the application of the economist's analytical
expertise. The elements that combine to determine the profitability of a
business are many and diverse. While economic analysis can produce only
measures of probabilities rather than mathematical certainty, it can at least
lessen and delineate the extent of the uncertainty, and in addition provide
new information through such techniques as the use of surveys. 164
162. "These projections were no mere 'interested guess' prepared with an eye on litiga-
tion. Instead, they were the product of deliberation by experienced businessmen charting their
future course." Id. at 566. Comparative yardstick measures were also considered. See text
accompanying notes 137-40 supra. In addition, the Second Circuit revealed a healthier attitude
of skepticism than it did when affirming the Perna Research decision, emphasizing that the
bases from which the projections were derived were set out at length and that there was
vigorous cross-examination. Defendant was able to demonstrate that some facets of the
projections were entitled to little weight (for instance, that the projected advertising and salary
expense for the first several years was probably too low), but on the whole plaintiff could
account for each of the figures on the basis of investigations, facts and defensible assumptions.
434 F.2d at 564-66. See the thoughtful cautionary instruction reproduced at id. at 564 n.2. In
contrast, the Perma Research court seemed to abrogate its fact-finding function by accepting
Singer's studies without question. See quotation in note 159 supra. While a businessman's
analysis should be given careful consideration, it should not be accepted as presumptively
correct, especially when subsequent facts contradict the analysis or cast doubt on its continuing
validity. Cf. S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173,
186-87, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1976) (The court ordered a new trial on the computation of
damages issue for breach of a contract to construct and lease a parking garage, when the recent
gasoline shortage descended one month after the judgment was rendered. The testimony of an
expert land economist who had concluded from "feasibility studies" that the operation would
have been very profitable was important evidence at the first trial.).
163. See Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973),
discussed in note 146 supra.
164. Surveys "are a source of estimates of the probability of outcomes in various unique
situations in which there is no history to serve as a guide." T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 152.
"What we are trying to do is not to define what will happen, but to reduce our uncertainties
concerning the future, to assign measures to them and to use our defined uncertainties as a basis
for building a speculative model of the future." Id. at 133; accord, C. ROBINSON, BUSINESS
FORECASTING: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 169 (1971).
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An example of the use of such studies and expert testimony is found in
S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp. ,165 an
action for breach of a contract to construct a parking garage and lease it to an
operator. An expert land economist concluded from "feasibility studies"
that the operation would be very profitable, taking into account such vari-
ables as the occupancy factor in an adjoining office building and the
projected transient usage. Rather than label his assumptions "speculative
and conjectural" (as would be the usual judicial practice under the new
business rule), 166 the California court instead deferred to the trial court's
evaluation of the expert testimony. 167
The antitrust decision of Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau168 is an even more striking example of reliance upon market studies
and surveys. Unlike Kreedman, expert testimony was the predominant
evidence of damages. 169 Plaintiff's business of computing and selling na-
tional mileage guides was destroyed before there was an opportunity for it to
become profitable. A marketing and public opinion research expert
compiled opinion surveys and "a wealth of other data." ' 170 He then
compiled a market study determining the total national market for mileage
guides and drew a number of conclusions on which to rely in estimating
plaintiff's ability to penetrate that market. From this foundation he presented
an opinion as to how many guides plaintiff would have sold over a thirteen
year period. A certified public accountant adopted these projected sales
figures, deducted actual known expense figures, and offered a net profit
analysis on this basis. The Fifth Circuit approved the admissibility of
evidence so constructed, stating that "[t]his indirect type of proof may
include estimates based on assumptions, at least so long as the assumptions
rest on adequate bases" and that the jury instructions in regard to the weight
to be given the expert testimony was a sufficient safeguard against predicat-
ing an award of damages upon uncertain evidence. 17
1
165. 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). This case is significant in several other
respects. First, the court rejected the contention that the measure of damages for breach of a
lease is always the general damages measure of the difference between agreed rent and rental
value. Id. at 184, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49. Second, it rejected the new business rule in favor of the
reasonable certainty test. Id. at 184-85, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49. Third, it entertained evidence of
the profitability of other garage operations of plaintiff and plaintiff's experience as a garage
operator. Id. at 185, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
166. See note 3 supra.
167. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 185, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
168. 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974).
169. Compare id. at 29, with text accompanying notes 165-67 supra.
170. 494 F.2d at 23.
171. Id. at 24; cf. Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d at 564 n.2 (reproduction of
trial judge's cautionary instruction).
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VI. A PROPOSED NEW TEST AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that many courts
have sloughed off the traditional restrictions of the new business rule in
favor of a more liberal, pragmatic approach to recovery for lost profits for an
unestablished business that may, in its most far-reaching form, recognize
the entire range of information that a businessman would consider in
forming an investment decision. This development, however, has been
rather sporadic and of varying intensity. Some jurisdictions have jettisoned
the new business rule altogether, others recognize only certain cir-
cumscribed exceptions, and still others continue to adhere to the rule as
classically stated. The law in this area is thus at a watershed stage of
evolution.
While the new business rule lingers on as an emasculated force, no
concise test of general applicability that can encompass the recent devel-
opments has arisen to replace it. How much certainty is enough certainty
remains uncertain. 172 "Reasonable" certainty can mean anything from
logical necessity to a strong hunch. The following test would give some
content to the meaning of reasonable certainty in this context: within the
rules of evidence regulating hearsay, opinion evidence and the qualification
of experts, all information that a business person would find relevant in
deciding whether to invest in the enterprise in question would ordinarily be
admissible on the issue of profits lost by a business on account of a contract
breach. A prima facie case would be established if the plaintiff's evidence,
when considered in the light most favorable to him, could support a decision
by a prudent business person that the enterprise would be an investment
within an acceptable degree of risk. 173 The jury should be instructed that if,
based upon an evaluation of all the evidence, a prudent business person
would more likely than not consider the enterprise to be an investment
within an acceptable degree of risk, then it must award some damages to the
plaintiff. 174 Other cautionary instructions would probably be warranted by
172. See Farnsworth, supra note 42, at 1213-14; Comment, supra note 48, at 999; Note,
The Requirements of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, supra note 1, at 325.
173. Of course it must necessarily be demonstrated that the loss, if any, was the proximate
result of a breach of a legal duty that would give rise to a substantive right of recovery. See text
accompanying note 46 supra.
174. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 25, § 29, at 108 ("[Ihe practice of investors
indicates that a prudent evaluation of a new enterprise may disclose that the chances of
successful profit making of a new undertaking. . . are much more favorable than the chances
of failure. The courts should be willing to accept a similar showing, if the proof is strong and the
wrong deliberate."); Comment, supra note 48, at 1018. ("Courts should not exclude informa-
tion used by businessmen in reaching business decisions, nor require appreciably more informa-
tion than businessmen commonly use.").
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the special circumstances of each case. Because the amount of damages is
always problematic, the jury should be given wide discretion in affixing the
amount so long as the threshold right to recovery is satisfied, subject to the
devices for controlling excessive verdicts. 175
Paralleling the increasing acceptance of various types of market anal-
yses and economic data as evidence in lost profit cases has been the growth
of sophisticated business forecasting techniques as tools for management
decisions and the consequent development of forecasting as a recognized
subdiscipline within the field of business economics.17 6 The relaxation of
judicial restrictions upon economic evidence represents, to some extent, a
conscious recognition of the increasing reliability of business forecasting.
The lacuna in remedial law, which the new business rule left uncharted
because exploratory techniques were deficient, can presently be filled in
some cases by business forecasting expertise. Businessmen facing capital
investment decisions desire to avoid mere speculation and guesswork at
least as much as courts do in adjudicating lost profits cases. Courts should
therefore rely on the same type of input as businessmen. 177
Business forecasting, of course, offers no panacea for the difficult
problems of proving the existence of lost profits for unestablished busi-
nesses. Economic analysis cannot transform an inherently unmeritorious
claim into a winner. In other cases, sufficient information may not be
available from which to extrapolate to any confident conclusion concerning
probable profitability. Forecasting commentators readily admit that fore-
casting deals only in probabilities-not certainities.17 8 The law does not
require precise certainty, however, but only "reasonable" certainty. 179 One
175. See text accompanying notes 220-41 infra.
176. See generally, e.g., N. ENRICK, MARKET AND SALES FORECASTING: A QUANTITATIVE
APPROACH (1969); METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF BUSINESS FORECASTING (W. Butler, R. Kavesh
& R. Platt eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as BKP]; T. MILNE, supra note 72; C. ROBINSON,
supra note 164.
177. Business managers of course must continually forecast the future in charting the
course of their firms. Business forecasting as used here means the more formalized process of
predicting the probable future consequences of business decisions, generally with the aid of
professional business economists. The emphasis here is upon capital investment decisions,
because this bears most directly upon the typical lost profit new business case. Formal
forecasting is often used to make these types of decisions. See T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 5; C.
ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 178; cf. Schultz, Sales Forecasting, in BKP, supra note 176, at
393, 396 (one purpose of the long-term forecast of five to twenty years is for considering entry
into new markets); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5699 (April 23, 1976) (SEC policy regarding
disclosure of projections of future economic performance to investors). See generally Hartz,
Risk Analysis in Capital Investment, 42 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1964, at 95.
178. See T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 157; C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 4, 169; Schultz,
supra note 177, at 395; Zarnowitz, How Accurate Have the Forecasts Been?, in BKP, supra
note 176, at 565, 568-70.
179. See note 98 supra.
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commentator has characterized the forecaster's task in these terms: "What
we are trying to do is not to define what will happen, but to reduce our
uncertainties concerning the future, to assign measures to them and to use
our defined uncertainities as a basis for building a speculative model of the
future. "' 80 The law of damages should require no more than this, and except
for the new business rule it has not.
A forecasting model for an individual business necessarily proceeds in
a three stage process: from a forecast of the general economy (or macro-
environment), to the market environment of the particular industry, and
finally to the individual firm in the market environment.' 81 Because each
stage builds on the more general stage preceding it, it follows that the most
uncertainty is at the individual firm level.'8 2 As a rule, when a business has a
history of past profits, records of these profits will be sufficiently certain as
evidence to support a recovery. The analysis therefore proceeds expressly
on the third level, conditions at the first and second levels being implicitly
reflected in the fact that the business has been profitable. On the other hand,
a plaintiff without a history of profits must present evidence from the second
level of the market environment as well, drawing inferences and conclusions
concerning his own business from this data. 183 Comparisons with the per-
formance of similar businesses are of this nature. Failure to offer some form
of evidence of the state of the industry during the contract period is
ordinarily fatal in the case of an unestablished business, because the avail-
able information concerning the individual business alone is not a sufficient
premise from which to conclude that future profits would have been
180. T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 133; cf. C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 13 (factors such
as profits which cannot be fully controlled are sometimes known as "target variables"). See
also Schultz, supra note 177, at 395.
181. C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 14; Schultz, supra note 177, at 395.
182. BKP, supra note 176, at 391.
183. Cf. Note, The Requirements of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, supra note 1, at
320 ("[W]here the plaintiff's own figures. . . do not possess sufficient strength it would seem
they should be supportable by evidence that the industry as a whole has had a history of
profitable operation."). One peculiar case has appeared to confuse the term "unestablished" in
the new business rule, which means unestablished as a specific firm, with "unestablished" as
meaning an unestablished industry. Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 44 P. 621(1896). A stronger argument can be made for denying lost profits as a matter of course when the
industry as well as the particular firm is unestablished or not profitable at the time than when
only the latter is new. See Biothermal Process Corp. v. Cohu & Co., 119 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 283 App. Div. 60, 126 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y.
689, 124 N.E.2d 323 (1954) (rejecting the classical new business rule, but denying recovery
when it appeared that the type of disposal plant that would have been built had never been
operated in the United States, but only in France). But see Perma Research & Dev. Co. v.
Singer Co., 402 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 987 (1976) (allowing recovery even where there was no comparable product, and hence no
established industry or market).
[Vol. 56
1978] LOST PROFITS
made.184 Evidence of the state of the general economy, while always
implicit in second and third level evidence, is almost never directly in
issue. 185
There are three generic types of input that forecasters use in construct-
ing forecasting models: controlled experiments (what people do); past
experience (what people have done); and surveys (what people say). 186 It is
impractical to carry out experiments in preparation for litigation, because
this method requires an ongoing business. The category of past experience is
broad enough to include the entire panoply of evidence traditionally relied
upon in lost profit cases. In addition, the business economist has access to
vast sources of statistics and other data, such as trade journals and govern-
ment publications, that can be incorporated into the model building proc-
ess. 187 It is in the use of surveys, however, that business economists can
make unique contributions in proving lost profits where past experience
alone would be incomplete.188 Consumer surveys can be marshalled as
evidence of a business' ability to penetrate a market if in-court testimony of
potential buyers would be prohibitively time-consuming and cumber-
some.
189
If complex economic evidence is utilized, it must be compiled by
experts. The services of business economists for this purpose are becoming
184. See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 391-94 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957). For an established business, 'the logic of recovery is as follows: the business has
been profitable in the past; if and only if there is a breach of contract will the future of the
business not be like its past; therefore, if there is no breach of contract, then the business will
be profitable in the future. The first premise is true; the second is false but nevertheless
accepted as true for purposes of the litigation if other conditions have remained constant. If the
business in question is unestablished, then both premises are false and neither can be accepted
as true for purposes of the litigation. Yet the same conclusion must be reached for there to be
recovery. The logic, obviously, is much more complex and requires more and different prem-
ises. The more generalized the market environment that serves as the starting point of analysis,
the more involved will be the logical steps-and hence the evidence-necessary for recovery.
185. But see S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d
173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (ordering new trial on effect of energy crisis on operation of
proposed parking garage).
186. C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 11.
187. For listings of informational resources, see N..ENRICK, supra note 176, at 94-110;
Rodriguez, Sources of Data, in BKP, supra note 176, at 124.
188. See T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 152. On the use of surveys generally, see id. at 133-52;
cf. Cohen, Surveys and Forecasting, in BKP, supra note 176, 76-92 (concerned more with the
application of surveys to sectoral analysis than with analysis of the position of the single firm).
189. Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 192, 284 S.W.2d 340, 349 (1955), is a rare
example of the use of testimony by consumers. As evidence of the wholesale cigarette business
that plaintiff lost by reason of defendant's failure to supply him with cigarettes at "cost," two
witnesses testified that they would have given plaintiff all their business at the price he could
have charged had not his supply been cut off. Such testimony is more feasible when the
business has only a few potential customers. It would be impracticable for most retail stores
because a statistically significant sampling would require a very large number of individuals.
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increasingly available through the growth of professional consulting
firms. 190 Not only are experts needed to compile the data, their expertise is
also essential to forming opinions based upon interpretation of the data.
Defendants also may find the assistance of experts crucial in rebutting a
plaintiff's case. Since forecasting techniques have become fairly systematic
and institutionalized, an expert can point out weaknesses in method or data
and false assumptions in another expert's testimony much more readily than
can a layman. 191 Business economists could also serve in the capacity of
court-appointed experts or special masters.
The testimony of accountants has always played an important role in
proving lost profits. With more widespread use of business economists, the
role of accountants would also be expanded. While business forecasting can
be used to form profit projections, it is more commonly used for projecting
sales as the target variable. A desirable sequence of proof would be for a
business economist to offer a sales projection, followed by the testimony of
an accountant who would adopt the sales projection and then deduct es-
timated expenses in order to arrive at a net profit figure that could be
reduced to present value. This approach was used in Terrell v. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau. 192
As a matter of the law of evidence, much of the economic evidence
would not be admissible without expert participation. A forecaster's projec-
tion, while based upon facts, is nevertheless an opinion, because the
forecaster draws inferences from known facts to arrive at his conclusions. 193
This type of opinion is not admissible when offered by a lay witness, 194 but
is admissible if offered by a qualified expert for whom proper foundation
has been laid. 195 Who may qualify as an expert is problematic; it is possible
that a managerial officer such as the company's president could not, while a
190. See generally Greenspan & Eickhoff, Economic Consulting, in BKP, supra note 176,
at 629-35.
191. See Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d at 563-67; Cecil Corely Motor Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 855-58 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
192. 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974); cf. Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948) (Plaintiff in action for failure to build an addition to the
building that housed plaintiff's garage repair business testified that he had to reject more than
half the business offered to him due to lack of space. A certified public accountant testified to a
net profit figure based upon the assumption that the sales of parts and labor would have doubled
during the period if the annex had been built.). See also Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977).
193. T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 1.
194. FED. R. EvID. 701; see MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE].
195. See FED. R. EVID. 702-705; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 29, at 107. See generally
MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, §§ 13-16.
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financial officer such as its treasurer could. 196 The safest course is always to
use outside experts. This practice also avoids the Boeotian trap of offering
an estimate of lost profits, which, though admissible, could not support a
judgment having been offered by an "interested" witness. 197
Under rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 98 an expert may give
opinion testimony without prior disclosure of underlying facts unless re-
quired to do so by the court. In courts in which the Federal Rules, or their
equivalent, are in effect, 199 it is unlikely that an expert-once qualified as
such-would have his testimony declared inadmissible for lack of a proper
foundation.200 He is, however, required to disclose underlying facts on cross
examination. 2 1 In most states where a proper foundation is still required, 202
and generally, as a matter of strategy, it is advisable that the expert disclose
his information and reasoning, utilizing exhibits whenever appropriate. At
any rate, when proof of lost profits is based upon past experience, the
relevant business records should be introduced into evidence at some point.
Otherwise the plaintiff will be penalized for failure to produce the best
evidence available.203
Hearsay problems may also be present. When evidence of past experi-
ence is the foundation used for expert testimony or otherwise, the supporting
documents are ordinarily admissible under the business records hearsay
exception. 204 Government publications and private market reports customar-
ily relied upon by business economists are also expressly excepted under the
196. Compare Thrift Wholesale, Inc. v. Malkinillion Corp., 50 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (E.D. Pa.
1943), with Rankin v. Associated Bill Posters of United States & Can., 42 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864 (1931). Older cases indicated that opinion testimony
should always be excluded in lost profits cases, e.g., Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co.,
101 N.Y. 205, 217, 4 N.E. 264, 271 (1881), but restrictions on expert opinion testimony have
subsequently been relaxed, especially with the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
197. See Tonchen v. All-Steel Equip., Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 454, 461, 300 N.E.2d 616, 621
(1973). Only Illinois-thankfully-appears to follow this rule. When an estimate is unrebutted
and supported by facts, a direct verdict for defendant on this basis would be senseless.
Interested persons have been competent to testify since Lord Denman's Act, 6 & 7 Viet. c. 85
(1843).
198. FED. R. EviD. 705.
199. As of 1977, six states had adopted the Federal Rules and seven more were considering
their adoption. Mueller, Foreward: Should Wyoming Adopt These Rules? to Symposium on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 585, 585-86 & 586 nn.2 & 3 (1977).
200. But see Tri-State Sys. Inc. v. Village Outlet Stores, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 81,217 S.E.2d
399 (1975); Peabody Constr. Co. v. First Fed. Parking Corp., 330 N.E.2d 497 (Mass. App.
1975). For a classic example of what would be an unsupported-even though divinely in-
spired-forecasting opinion, see Genesis 41:15-32 (Joseph's prediction to Pharoah that seven
good years would be followed by seven bad years).
201. FED. R. EvID. 705.
202. See MCCORMICKIEvIDENCE, supra note 194, § 14, at 31.
203. See text accompanying notes 120 & 121 supra.
204. FED. R. EvID. 803(6); MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, § 306; see Flintkote Co.
v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
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federal rules. 205 Surveys present more of a problem; if conducted for
litigation purposes rather than in the regular course of business, they might
not be admissible under the business records exception. 206 Surveys should,
however, be admitted under the catch-all exception of rule 803(24), which
provides for admission when the defendant has had an opportunity before
trial to examine the survey and thereby formulate any objections if it appears
that the survey was conducted without adequate safeguards to ensure objec-
tivity and statistical accuracy. 20 7
Introduction of all relevant records may be burdensome. While sum-
maries are a great aid to judicial economy, at least one court has refused to
allow recovery based upon an exhibit when the records used by the account-
ant in preparing the exhibit were not produced, seemingly on best evidence
rule grounds. 208 Rule 1006 expressly allows summaries of voluminous
writings as long as the originals are available for examination by the parties
or production in court, thus eliminating this problem. 2°9
Finally, market studies prepared by the defendant or authorized and
adopted by him may be used against him as an admission by a party-
opponent, thus avoiding the hearsay bar to admissibility. 210 In all other cases
the accountant or business economist who carries out the study should be
prepared to authenticate the factual records relied upon as exhibits, as well
as his conclusions if they are in the form of an exhibit. Under the federal
rules, however, the facts relied upon by the expert need not themselves be
admissible, 211 a point that allows the business economist virtually unrestrict-
ed freedom to exercise the total range of his professional skill in formulating
the opinion he will present in court.
Because expert testimony is likely to be very complex when used to
prove lost profits, there is an inherent danger of unfair surprise to the
defendant. This danger is largely mitigated, however, by rules of evidence
that require disclosure of the basis for expert opinion212 and production of
205. FED. R. EvID. 803(8), (17). The common law is generally in accord. Id. 803(17),
Advisory Comm. Note; MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, § 315.
206. See MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, § 308, at 723-24.
207. FED. R. EVID. 803(24). See generally Note, Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of
Public Opinion Polls, 52 MICH. L. REV. 914 (1954).
208. Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 303 F.2d 39, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1962).
209. FED. R. EVID. 1006. The common law is in accord. MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note
194, § 233, at 564.
210. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, § 762; see text
accompanying notes 155-59 supra.
211. FED. R. EvID. 703. But cf. MCCORMICK/EVIDENCE, supra note 194, § 15 (majority
rule, albeit with a strong trend contra, is that expert opinion must be based on admissible
evidence).
212. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 705.
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documents when summaries are used.213 In addition, liberal discovery rules
now enable the defendant to learn how the plaintiff will prove his damages
claim, 214 thus affording him an adequate opportunity to prepare his own case
in rebuttal. 215
Focusing on the information that businessmen use in making decisions
as the basis of the test for proving the existence of lost profits for an
unestablished business does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff must
always produce formal forecasting studies. Full scale forecasting-espe-
cially the use of surveys-is costly, and therefore may not be economically
feasible for a small business or where the ad damnum is relatively small. 216
A plaintiff should not be penalized simply because he cannot afford the
most rarefied expert assistance, but there should be an insistence that he
produce the relevent information that he has within his possession. 217 Many
of the methods of forecasting are simple and can be used by small businesses
to great advantage. 218 A strong case can usually be constructed from ac-
counting records on hand by anyone with common business sense, if it is
prepared and presented in a complete and logical manner. One cannot read
the opinions in this area and not be impressed by the number of cases that
have been lost-not because the claim was inherently deficient-but rather
because of inadequate preparation of counsel.
VII. POSSIBLE DEVICES FOR CONTROLLING UNDULY LARGE VERDICTS
AND APPORTIONING RISK
The proposed test for allowing recovery of lost profits for an unestab-
lished business addresses mainly the problem of certainty of proof. This test
does not resolve the other major problem that the new business rule seeks to
address: the unduly large verdict. The policy of the new business rule not to
apportion risks through some form of compromise has resulted in an inade-
quate resolution of this problem.219 Nevertheless, there are bases for
compromise that can alleviate the danger of placing too great a burden on a
213. Id. 1006.
214. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (especially 34).
215. When both parties are well prepared, the possibility of confusing the jury is also
lessened. Extensive pretrial discovery can be used to shorten the litigation by facilitating the
delineation of issues and the obtaining of admissions of uncontested points and stipulations
regarding the admissibility of evidence. When both parties make a good faith effort to simplify
the issues, the expert testimony in a case for lost profits of business is likely to be little more
confusing to the jury than proof of loss of earnings in a wrongful death action.
216. See T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 134; C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 180-87.
217. See text preceding note 120 supra.
218. See C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 185-86.
219. See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra.
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breaching party and at the same time adequately protect the expectation
interest of the promisee.
The reduction to present value of amounts that would have been earned
in the future is not really a compromise at all, but rather a necessary
calculation to avoid giving the plaintiff a recovery of more than he de-
serves. 220 It has been clearly established that when the plaintiff would have
contributed his own labor in conducting the business, then he must deduct
the value of his labor as an expense in arriving at a profit figure. 221
Alternatively, if the breach has freed the plaintiff to work elsewhere, he
must deduct what he in fact earned as a credit against anticipated profits. 222
The principle that the value of labor should be deducted from total
revenues as an expense is-like the concept of present value-not properly
understood as a compromise, but rather follows by definition from the
meaning of profits.223 Similarly, the value of the capital that would have
been invested in the business may be freed by a contractual breach to be put
to other uses. The defendant should be given credit for the income that this
freed capital could earn elsewhere. Any investment entails some risk. A fair
compromise apportionment of this risk would provide that the breaching
party be given credit for the income on a relatively safe bond investment
which the freed capital could be expected to yield. While early cases
addressed this idea by excluding the value of interest on capital from the
220. Present value is defined as "the amount which, if invested at the specified rate of
return, will grow to an amount equal to the anticipated cash amount at the specified future
date." M. GORDON & G. SHILLINGLAW, supra note 53, at 247. This figure can be calculated with
the use of tables. For example, suppose that by reason of a breach of a franchise agreement
plaintiff has proven that he would have made a profit of $100 each year for the 10 year contract
period, which runs from approximately the date of the judgment. He has thus lost $1000. If he
were given the entire amount now, however, he could invest it at a rate of, for instance, 5%, and
accumulate more at the end of 10 years than he would have lost, namely $1,629.00. Since he
would have received $100 each year, however, rather than $1000 at the end of the period, the
present value of $1000 for a 10 year period, $613.90, would not be adequate. Instead, his loss
should be calculated as an annuity, which would award him $772.17, leaving him at the end of 10
years with $1,257.79 (figures calculated from tables in id. at 741 app. A.). For cases in which
present value has been used, see, e.g., Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d at 454;
S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-W. Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1976). It was held not to be error to fail to include a jury instruction on present value in
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d at 664.
221. See, e.g., Gordon v. Indusco Mgmt. Corp., 164 Conn. 262, 274-76, 320 A.2d 811,819-
20 (1973); Buck v. Mueller, 221 Or. 271, 284, 351 P.2d 61, 67 (1960).
222. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1972); Furrer v. Interna-
tional Health Assurance Co., 256 Or. 429, 474 P.2d 759 (1970). But cf. Aronowicz v. Nalley's,
Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1973) (allowing a recovery of lost profits by
manufacturer against defendant distributor of its products who terminated the agreement,
notwithstanding that plaintiff secured another broker whose actual sales exceeded defendant's
estimate). It would seem that the appropriate measure would be whichever of the two figures-
value of labor or actual earnings-yields the higher earnings.
223. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
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definition of profits,224 only one recent case has applied this principle.225
Widespread adoption, whether based on the definition of profits or as part of
the mitigation of damages doctrine, promises to mollify significantly the
large verdict problem, because under its aegis there would only be a
recovery of lost profits if the estimated return on capital were in excess of
the prevailing rate of return on low-risk bonds. The recovery formula would
be
[(total estimated percentage of return on capital226- the prevailing
percentage of return on bonds) x (capital investment)] x (number
of years of recovery period) = total lost profits.
Total lost profits, when reduced to present value, would equal the allowable
recovery.2 27 If the value of the plaintiff's labor were capitalized, then the
formula would account for this factor without the necessity of giving a
separate credit.
The need for compromise is most apparent when the business in
question is of a speculative nature, and therefore must yield an abnormally
high profit return to offset the increased risk and thereby attract investment.
One extreme alternative would be to deny recovery altogether on the ground
that the speculative nature of the business makes proof of lost profits too
uncertain. The other would be to allow total recovery based upon the high
rate of return. 228 A compromise basis is arrived at by averaging in the
number of known failures in the industry to arrive at an overall mean
percentage of return for the type of business, and to use this figure as the
basis of recovery. 229 Thus, the probability of the risk of failure would be
divided between the parties.
The amount of recovery of course varies directly with the length of
time for which lost profits are calculated. There is usually no problem when
224. E.g., Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, I l I F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1901); Morrow v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 140 Mo. App. 200, 123 S.W. 1034 (1909).
225. Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977); see text
accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
226. Whether the percentage of return would be calculated as pre-tax earnings or post-tax
earnings would depend upon whether the recovery was of a sort subject to taxation.
227. See Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d at 454-55.
228. See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 884 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
229. For example, suppose Omegamax Corporation was formed for the purpose of manu-
facturing atomic flatulators. There are four successful producers of atomic flatulators, all
enjoying a return of approximately 18%. Two other companies, however, have failed. The
average return for the industry is therefore only 12%. This figure should thus be used as
Omegamax's legitimate expectation. Statistics concerning industry performance are available
in trade journals and government publications. Cf. T. MiLNE, supra note 72, at 10-Il (projec-
tions should show the probabilities of the risk of failure).
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a specific period is included in the contract230 or the breach merely delays
the opening of the business for a determinate period. If no contract period is
specified, however, or if lost profits cannot be proved with certainty over
the contract period, 231 then some period must be chosen. Merely to instruct
the jury to confine the recovery to a "reasonable period of time" 232 provides
no guidance. If the contract is of indefinite duration, then the period of
recovery should be no longer than the average life of a new business in the
industry233 or, if such statistics are not available for the type of business in
question, then the average life of a new business in general. This limit
should be observed even when a longer, definite period is called for in the
contract. Often the nature of the evidence itself will place a practical limit on
the recovery period. Even the most elaborate of economic studies can
project with any degree of confidence for no more than several years. 234 The
cutoff point should occur when the illumination of reasonable certainty
fades into the shadow of speculation, which in practice would be where a
forecaster would decline to issue an opinion, or else qualify his opinion to
such an extent that it could not be given credence. 235
The characteristic form of a forecaster's projection itself provides a
basis for compromise. Forecasting speaks in terms of probability or measur-
able uncertainty. 236 Therefore, forecasts do not ordinarily give single num-
ber projections. Instead they present a range of probabilities, represented by
figures of a most optimistic outcome, a most likely outcome, and a most
pessimistic outcome. 3 7 The latter figure would be the most certain to be
reached, even though a plaintiff might legitimately ask for damages based
230. See Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970) (ten year distributor-
ship franchise agreement); Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn. App. 129, 469 S.W.2d 678 (1971) (five year
lease, with an option to renew for five additional years).
231. See Automatic Canteen Co. of Wash. v. Automatic Canteen Co. of Am., 182 Wash.
133, 45 P.2d 41 (1935) (recovery for 23 year unexpired term of exclusive distributorship
agreement too speculative).
232. See Shearon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 478 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1973).
233. See Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d at 455 (calculating damages on
assumed minimum 10 year "life" of new distributorship). When the object of the contract is a
valuable right enabling the promisee to do business that would be treated as an asset by an
accountant-such as a patent license or a franchise-and amortized over an assumed life, then
this accounting convention could be adopted as fixing the applicable recovery period. This may
have been done in Lee.
234. Forecasts for 5 to 20 year periods are considered to be long term and do not usually
take into account business cycles. Schultz, supra note 177, at 396.
235. Cf. T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 7 ("The planning horizon is simply the period over the
future to which decisions being made now will be relevant.") At least one case has looked at the
relative fault of the parties in fixing the recovery period. Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K.
Williams & Co.-E., 377 F. Supp. 418, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2973 (1977).
236. T. MILNE, supra note 72, at 155.
237. Id. at 10-11; C. ROBINSON, supra note 164, at 169-71.
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on the most likely outcome. Calculating damages on the most pessimistic
projection would not only ease the burden of excessive risk on a promisor,
but would also be more consonant with the policy of reasonable certainty.238
An obvious but under utilized solution to the problem of excessive
verdicts is the use of the remittitur2 39 The application of this traditional
procedural device can be used to restrict jury awards to that amount of
damages which has been proven in satisfaction of the legal standard of
reasonable certainty. 21
Where the nature of the venture contemplated by the contract is so
unique that it would be impossible to forecast its probable outcome short of
conducting the venture as an experiment-but it is nevertheless quite certain
that some profits would have resulted-then it is entirely defensible to arrive
at some admittedly arbitrary damage figure as a compromise.
241
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the new business rule has the virtue of any bright line test of
serving judicial economy by excluding offers of evidence and helping courts
avoid facing hard questions, such objectives are extrinsic to the original
purpose of the rule and should not mandate a continuing adherence to it
when its major premise-that past profits are necessarily the only reliable
basis from which the existence of future profits may be inferred-is no
238. See Furrer v. International Health Assurance Co., 256 Or. 429,474 P.2d 759 (1970) for
an example of calculation of damages on this basis.
239. Remittitur has not often been applied in new business cases because the new business
rule has been most often used as an excuse to keep the lost profit damages issue from going to
the jury at all. Therefore, there has usually been no jury finding that could be the object of a
remittitur.
240. See Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 20-21, 390 P.2d 677, 689 (1969).
241. See Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634
(8th Cir. 1975). Defendent was hired to manage a fund-raising drive for the local Girl Scouts.
Only $89,000 was grossed-far short of the $345,000 goal. Defendant's director of sales
testified that the goal probably could have been reached if the campaign had been directed
properly, but there was no guarantee that any money would in fact be raised. The Eighth Circuit
upheld a jury verdict for $35,000. Id. at 643-44. In Riley v. General Mills, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 780
(E.D. Pa. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 346 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1965), defendant improperly
discontinued a promotional venture whereby it would put schoolchild accident insurance policy
applications in boxes of Betty Crocker Gingerbread Mix that would offer $1000 of coverage for
$1. Schoolchild accident insurance was a relatively new field at the time and had never been
sold through the agency of dehydrated gingerbread men. Plaintiff estimated that there would
have been a 60% to 90% return of the applications; defendant estimated that there would have
been a 1% return. The court concluded that there would have been a 25% return, and awarded
damages for guaranteed commissions on net premiums on this basis,.but denied a recovery of
contingent commissions on net profits from premiums as.being too speculative. Id. at 784-85;
cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 562, quoted at text
accompanying note 106 supra (if the fact of damage is proved with certainty, then the amount
may be left to reasonable inference). See generally Comment, supra note 48 (advocating more
widespread resort to compromise and approximation in lost profit cases).
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longer acceptable. The mere tacking on of exceptions to the rule is unsatis-
factory, because they do not serve as reliable guides to decisionmaking for
particular cases and have led to inconsistent results. A less intractable test
along the lines suggested above242 that takes into account developing
commercial and economic realities is needed. The recent cases allowing lost
profit recoveries for unestablished businesses have already, in effect, tacitly
adopted this test, while for the most part still framing the analysis in terms of
the new business rule. The time has come to make explicit that which has
heretofore been implicit, and for our judicial system to exhibit more faith in
the capacity of participants in this economic regime to see their endeavors
bear fruit. 243
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
242. See text accompanying notes 172-75 supra.
243. Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 42, at 1216 ("All in all, our system of legal remedies for
breach of contract, heavily influenced by the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has
shown a marked solicitude for men who do not keep their promises.").
